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CONSOLIDATING MALI'S DECENTRALIZED GOVERNANCE SYSTEM

ANNUAL REPORT YEAR TWO

SEPT. 12, 2004 – SEPT. 30, 2005

This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Management Systems International.

Consolidating Mali's Decentralized Governance System

Annual Report Year Two, Sept. 12, 2004 – Sept. 30, 2005



Management Systems International

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600 Water Street, SW

Washington, DC 20024

Contracted under 688-C-00-03-00067-00

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CONTENTS

ACRONYMS.....	IV
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	1
Highlights	1
Consolidation.....	2
A. INTRODUCTION.....	3
1. Contractual Context and Reporting Structure.....	3
2. Political context	4
B. IMPLEMENTATION STATUS REPORT	8
1. Objective one: Participation Of Key Communal Actors In Democratic Governance Increased In Targeted Communes.....	8
2: Objective 2: Macro-political enabling environment strengthened.....	30
C. PUBLIC-PRIVATE ALLIANCES (PPA)/COST SHARE.....	33
Total Contributions.....	33
Other Contributions Not Included In The \$542,315 Figure	35
D. MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E).....	35
Methodology for Quantitative and Qualitative Data Collection.....	36
New and Modified SO8 Indicators	36
Data Quality Assessment.....	36
Geographic Information System.....	36
CONCLUSIONS.....	38
Difficulties	39
Building ownership for sustainable systems.....	40
The civil society assumption.....	40
Economic hardship	40
Governance in the area of the Office du Niger	41
OVERVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION IN FY06	41
SUMMARY OF PGP ACTIVITIES FROM FYO6 ANNUAL PLAN	42
First Semester activities.....	42
Second Semester Activities	43
APPENDIX A: EXPLANATORY NOTE FOR THE MAP SECTION OF THE REPORT.....	45
APPENDIX B: QUALITATIVE STUDY, SEGOU REGION 2005.....	61

ACRONYMS

ACCRM	Association de Conseils de Cercles et d'Assemblées Régionales
ACGC	Association de Conseillers en Gestion Communautaire
AMM	Association des Municipalités du Mali
AN	Assemblée Nationale
ANICT	Agence Nationale d'Investissements des Collectivités Territoriales
APE	Association de parents d'élèves
AR	Assemblée Régionale
ASACO	Association de Santé Communautaire
CARE	CARE-Mali
CC	Conseil Communal
CCC	Centre de Conseil Communal
CESC	Conseil Economique, Social et Culturel
CGS	Comité de Gestion Scolaire
CLIC	Centre d'Apprentissage Communautaire et d'Information
CLO	Comité Local d'Orientation
CRO	Comité Régional d'Orientation
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DNCT	Direction Nationale des Collectivités Territoriales
FY	Fiscal Year
GIS	Geographic Information System
GRM	Government of the Republic of Mali
HCC	Haut Conseil des Collectivités
MATCL	Ministère de l'Administration Territoriale et des Collectivités Locales
MSI	Management Systems International
PDC	Plan de Développement Communal
PDI	Plan de Développement Institutionnel
PGP	Programme de Gouvernance Partagée
PRODEPAM	Projet de Développement de la Production Agricole au Mali
SPP	Strategic Partnership Plan
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
SAVE	Save the Children-USA
TDRL	Taxe de Développement Régional et Local
UNOMIN	Union Nationale des Opérateurs Miniers
USAID	Agence Américaine pour le Développement International
WAWI	West Africa Water Initiative

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Shared Governance Program is a USAID-funded project implemented under contract # 688-C-00-03-00067-00 awarded in September, 2003 to Management Systems International (MSI). It is referred to in this report by its acronym, PGP, from the French name: Programme de Gouvernance Partagée. PGP is present in 250 communes and at the national level through partnership with four institutional partners and 15 national NGOs.

In keeping with its stated operating principles, PGP has put 250 communes in the project driver's seat this year, allowing communal actors themselves to diagnose their current situation and plot the course ahead. This report is built on 250 individual projects by communes pressing ahead according to their own action plan. Results reflect an array of initiatives that varies from one commune, cercle, and region to the next. PGP believes this variety mirrors the diversity of situations found at the grassroots level in the patchwork that is decentralization.

Implementation of PGP has been carried out in 2 phases, the first targeting 73 pilot communes, the second adding 177 more communes to reach a total of 250. PGP is now in the second phase. Strategic Partnership Plans (SPP) are now complete for almost 250 target communes and PGP can boast a full year of activity completed under SPPs in 73 first year communes. The report is structured in 2 major parts: Participation and partnership at the local level, and national enabling environment.

Compilation and analysis of this year's achievements confirm the undelying hypothesis behind PGP's shared governance approach: local governance requires the emergence of new, more dynamic relationships between actors and between sectors. Decentralization introduces changes in economic, political and administrative relations and these cannot be successfully implemented without a corresponding evolution in the minds and behavior of its principal actors. For this reason, PGP facilitates enlargement of spaces for open, informed debate and seeks to bring actors together to break down barriers built over decades of deficit in dialogue between communities and the array of state and development agencies that intervene on their behalf.

The results clearly speak for themselves: efforts by commune actors in the great majority of communes yielded new, renewed and strengthened relations with local associations managing health centers, schools, waterworks, natural resources, as well as with herders, peasants, and private sector operators. Dialogue informed thousands of citizens – most often for the first time – on the financial realities of their commune and involved them in planning a development course. The dividends of this interaction are visible in improved recovery of local taxes, investment priorities that better reflect the community's most pressing needs, in improved management of local markets, and in greater resolve and skill in dealing with conflicts that too often paralyze economic and social activity.

HIGHLIGHTS

More than 55% of pilot communes increased overall revenue in relative or absolute terms, most of them significantly, an increase of 25% over FY04. This was achieved despite an election year and the worst locust invasion in 18 years in an environment where one in four people lives in extreme poverty and one

in three children suffers from stunted growth. It is noteworthy that in the great majority of cases no enforcement was available and that the increases stem from goodwill alone.¹

Several communes also made a valiant effort to improve management of markets and other infrastructure, weeding out corrupt practice and introducing new partnerships with merchants' and women's associations. In one case, revenue increased thirty fold by the introduction of a new, simplified management system.

Seventy-seven target communes report public participation in development planning this year, an increase of more than 30% over 2004. This is a marked departure from past practice. In at least 30 communes, planning committees held general village assemblies. In communes where participation data was reported, 70% of elected officials on average participated in planning activities that reached 81% of the villages in the commune on average. In 16 communes, inter-village fora enabled people from adjoining villages to come together, identify issues of common concern and prioritize needs.

This achievement represents a formidable learning opportunity for constituents traditionally kept in the dark. When given the numbers behind their economic and administrative condition, citizens can begin to act and react. Opaque public administration has enabled a significant portion of meager resources to be channeled out of public service delivery.

The number of communes that follow legal procedures in executing their annual budget increased by 70% over 2004. According to field reports, 59 communes now use legal accounting formats in recording revenue and expense. This result is promising. Healthy management practice and transparency are definite requisites for sustainable local resource mobilization. But the ability of communes to manage bears on much more. The commune is, by definition and by law, the focal point of health and education, natural resource management and agricultural production. The institution will not be in a position to be a catalyst and facilitator until it masters its own management.

Commune officials addressed a total of 39 conflicts with PGP support. Of the 39, 29 were resolved entirely, 6 partially and 4 are ongoing. In 33 communes PGP support led to the establishment of conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms. Increasing pressure over land use and resources increases competition and desperation, leading to increases in the number of conflicts. Conflict is also a natural byproduct when constituents group together in formal modern structures to manage common resources. Resolving organizational dysfunctions within organized groups will require conflict management and facilitation skills at the commune level. The experience gained in attempting to resolve those 39 conflicts is extremely valuable for newly elected officials in that respect.

Results indicate a 7.4 point difference between the first and second year communes in the number of communes where activities target women's needs. This result is a reflection of intense activity by PGP to include women in all aspects of commune life. As a result of PGP, women are better organized and more likely to make their voices heard in investment and other decisions.

CONSOLIDATION

The ultimate success of communes depends not only on the initiatives and achievements of local elected officials, but also on a series of factors over which communes have little or no control: fiscal regime, transfers of financial resources, capacity, means and behavior of state officials, support from sectoral

¹ The indicator measures rate of recovery only. The data presented here factors in communes whose rate of tax recovery did not increase – due to revisions that greatly increased fiscal inventory – but whose overall revenue did increase thanks to their improved recovery efforts. The percentage of increase is relative to the internal PGP baseline. Complete results on 37 indicators and sub-indicators are in the M&E section of this report.

ministries and development agencies. Although the results herein are promising, improvements are unlikely to be consolidated unless there are significant improvements in the above.

PGP continued its efforts at strengthening the advocacy capacities of partner institutions and civil society organizations to influence key issues such as the transfer of resources to the local level. Its Component III Management Team has been successful with its approach to synergy-building, which consisted of putting the leaders of the national institutions in the driver's seat, of having them take charge of creating synergies among their technical and financial partners. This has led PGP to undertake joint activities with PAGRAN, a U.N.D.P.-funded project, and the Conrad Adenauer Foundation under the aegis of the AN and the HCC. Most of these activities were planned, implemented, and reviewed together with the host institution, with each of the partners contributing the resources available under its program.

A. INTRODUCTION

I. CONTRACTUAL CONTEXT AND REPORTING STRUCTURE

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Mission in Bamako, Mali, awarded contract # 688-C-00-03-00067-00 on September 12, 2003, to Management Systems International (MSI) for the implementation of the first three years of a five-year project entitled "Consolidating Mali's Decentralized Governance System". Immediately following the signing of the contract and in accordance with the implementation approach described in its proposal, MSI subcontracted with CARE International, Save the Children USA, Koni-Expertise and International Resources Group (IRG) for project implementation, which began in mid-September, 2003. The project, designed for five years, is fully-funded for the three initial years, with an option for USAID to extend two additional years. The three year funding level is \$9,362,324.00. The two expected intermediate results (IR) are:

- Participation of key communal level actors in democratic governance increased in targeted communes;
- Macro-political enabling environment strengthened;

The terms of the contract require MSI to submit semestrial and annual reports to the Cognizant Technical Officer (CTO) of the USAID Mission. This second annual report is submitted in partial fulfillment of the above-cited contract, and covers the second year of project implementation (and USAID's FY05), from October 1, 2004 through September 30, 2005. For activities which took place in the first half of the year, more detail can be found in the six month report, already submitted.

This annual report is composed of six major parts:

- I. An Introduction, including the political context;
- II. An Implementation Report, including all major activities and progress toward results;
- III. A Public-Private Alliance/Cost share section, reporting on match contributions;
- IV. A Monitoring and Evaluation section, including a Results Tracking Table;
- V. A Conclusion, including a description of major obstacles and opportunities identified as well as an overview of planning for year three of implementation;
- VI. An Appendix, containing maps and other important supplementary information.

The program will be referred to throughout this report by its less wieldy acronym, "PGP", from the French title, *Programme de Gouvernance Partagée*.

2. POLITICAL CONTEXT

During the course of FY05 the PGP staff accompanied 73 Year 1 communes in the implementation of their Strategic Partnership Plans (SPP) for improving local governance, facilitated Participatory Commune Diagnostics in 163 Year 2 communes, and regularly participated in meetings of the local and regional decentralization steering committees (*Comités Locaux et Régionaux d'Orientation*, known as “CLOs” and “CROs”, respectively) for the purpose of sharing information with other actors.

The sweeping reform of the administrative system in Mali, focused on comprehensive decentralization, originated in the national conference of 1991. This was a major political response to the expressed needs of Mali's neglected and oppressed people and came about following popular uprisings against a non-transparent and unresponsive mode of governance that marked a 23 year dictatorship. The reform is strongly based on a political rationale of democratizing the public realm and fits perfectly into the shared governance approach.

PARTICIPATION AND PARTNERSHIP IN COMMUNAL GOVERNANCE

PGP has reached a critical juncture in its efforts to reinforce grassroots democracy through decentralization. After two years of implementation, the PGP Team has done some action-learning that it would like to share.

- Highly conscious of the need for ownership of governance improvement programs by commune actors, all PGP field teams facilitated at the outset the establishment of local committees that would take charge of PGP activities. They have also encouraged the creation of fora for consultation and discussion of issues of importance to various actors (referred to in French as “cadres de concertation”). In many cases, these organs and fora have been less functional than expected because of the prevailing habit of seeking compensation for participation, which is especially widespread in the District of Bamako, Koulikoro, and Segou. These cases show clearly that participation will not be promoted using the old ways of doing business and that change (acceptance by key actors to participate without the past incentives) will not happen overnight. PGP and its partners must find ways to innovate in that domain to work over time in order to achieve the desired result of creating participation based on the actors' own perceived interests instead of on their pocketbooks.
- Throughout Mali, especially at the commune level, people bestow legitimacy upon multiple institutions or structures in an overlapping fashion, all of which must be considered equally and taken into account when one interacts with a given community. The Commune Council (CC) possesses democratic legitimacy, but in the context of an electoral system in which multiple candidates for the CC are listed under a single political party, this legitimacy may be diminished when political parties with a single councillor win the Mayor's seat through deal-making at the expense of a candidate with the majority vote. On the other hand, the legitimacy of traditional and religious structures is very strong at the grassroots level. Shared governance is supposed to bring together all of the structures and actors with legitimacy in the eyes of the people so as to yield well-respected decisions and higher levels of citizens' participation. Up to now, the PGP has not sufficiently incorporated the legitimate structures and actors that exist outside the realm of modern governance. If the PGP is to gain the full participation and ownership of all sectors and groups of the population, it will have to intensify and extend its work in this regard, by reaching out formally to the other structures and actors -- or rather, persuading the communes to do so.
- In many communes, elected officials and their partners in local civil society organizations are involved in informal partnerships in the management of the affairs of the commune. They also use those mechanisms to manage their interactions. Both sides are reluctant to formalize these

partnerships, although this is mandated by law, mainly because they fear that they will be unable to fulfil their long-term contractual commitments.

- There is a high potential for involving the private sector in local governance and their contribution could be particularly significant in urban areas. However, like the general population, the private sector lacks confidence in local government and will never get involved in the provision of financial resources to communes for the delivery of public services so long as communes do not manage their affairs in a transparent manner. Shared governance is contributing to the introduction of the requisite transparency.
- The PGP design was based on the assumption that civil society organizations (CSOs) were prepared and ready to take the lead, participate and contribute in the shared governance process in the communes. However, this assumption has not been validated by the realities on the ground. Most CSOs exist on an informal basis. Moreover, they face major challenges in a number of sectors. For example, the education sector has introduced a local school management body known as the Comité de Gestion Scolaire, or “CGS”, which is in open conflict with the predecessor organization, known as the Association des Parents d’Elèves, or “APE”. The institutional weaknesses displayed by many ASACOs were not anticipated. All these findings require a change in field approach, which takes these phenomena into account.
- Women’s participation has increased in most places where a special effort was made to promote it, but such participation is still very weak. Nonetheless, it is increasingly accepted that such participation will increase with the improved economic condition of women in the community.
- The quality of local governance is highly dependent on the provision of “appui conseil” (support and advice -- essentially on-the-job training) and the “tutelle” (the MATCL bodies at the regional, circle and local levels, that are supposed to provide guidance and support to the communes) whose role by law is to verify the functioning of the communes and to assure that they follow proper administrative and financial procedures. The communes need this partnership. There are many obstacles to the provision of quality appui conseil on the part of the tutelle and the GRM’s technical services. They require payment from communes for the provision of this appui conseil. As a result, these partners do not make their expected contribution to the successful consolidation of Mali’s decentralized system of governance.

COMMUNAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

The unavailability of resources continues to be the major problem in the functioning of communes. It threatens the political survival of local officials and their standing in the eyes of their constituents.

- The flow of resources remains at the same weak level. The central government has made little progress in the transfer of resources to the decentralized levels. Resources continue to be highly controlled at the central level where very little effort has been made to change that situation. Central sectorial projects continue to be designed and implemented as if the process of decentralization did not exist.
- The expansion of the resource base is of critical importance to commune officials in their efforts to increase the delivery of public goods and services to their constituents and to improve their well-being. This determines their success or failure in office. Communes previously relied heavily on the natural resources in their communes as their main tax base. Urban and rural communes have all suffered a major loss of resource base due to the suspension of their right to distribute and sell land, which used to be their primary source of revenue.
- The PGP/USAID and PACT/GTZ experts have worked together to install financial management systems in the communes that respect the existing rules and regulations, but they have had only limited backing from the GRM agencies with a stake in the results. A major roadblock has been the lack of interest shown by technicians and state officials. The improvements sought in the

communes' financial management will only occur when the activities are fully supported by the field representatives of the MATCL and the Ministry of Finance.

- The decrees and statutes for the creation of a local civil service (“fonction publique des collectivités”) have been approved and made public for a while. However, their application has been continuously delayed for many different reasons, including the opposition of union leaders who have threatened to strike. This situation has created a very high level of turnover in the support services to communes and has deprived them of an essential resource for their smooth functioning.

MACRO-LEVEL ENABLING ENVIRONMENT

The macro-political environment clearly remains one that is not entirely favorable to the decentralization process. There are numerous developments in the decentralization and local governance consolidation process that are causes for concern to those structures, like the PGP, that are involved in grassroots empowerment.

- Many aspects of the current system give the impression that local elected officials are set up for failure. They are subjected to a one-way control by Governors and Prefects who do not want to exercise that control without being paid by the communes; they do not receive any resources without receiving appui conseil from specialists whom they have to pay; and they are called upon to attend training sessions that take them away from their communes and keep them from working on issues of interest to their constituents.
- The point was made above that decentralization was a political choice made by the nation's political actors in response to public demand. It should enjoy the full support of political leaders. Unfortunately, the process currently suffers from a lack of support from the major political parties. The political realm is characterized by a single mode of thought (“pensée unique”), unanimous and unquestioning support to the Head of State, and the search for consensus on all issues. This suppresses major debates and contradictions that are characteristic of a healthy democratic system. The current arrangement precludes the institutionalization of strong, healthy political parties.
- Another negative development is the continued systemic focus on capacity-building training as a prerequisite for any changes and for the transfer of responsibilities and resources. In fact, training has become the major weapon used to block this transfer. The training proposed is most often academic rather than practical and is of very limited use to elected local officials. It poses problems by diverting resources away from the on-the-job accompaniment needed in the communes. This was clearly noticeable in the water sector, which has advanced farther in the transfer of responsibilities than other ministries. The conventional wisdom, that elected officials must be trained to be able to manage the affairs of a commune, is invalid. They do not need all this training and do not know what to do with it. The substitute for this training is the creation of the local civil service system and the assignment of qualified technicians to decentralized levels of government. It is important that the actors involved in the process realize that elected officials could never substitute for technicians and vice versa. This is perceived by insightful actors who are attempting to put in place the local civil service. Unfortunately, there are many levels of resistance to the application of the laws on this process.
- Another issue slowing the consolidation of decentralization is the attempt to create a parallel system of administration to be run by appointed professional administrators. The professional administrators continue to fight and push the idea that successful decentralization is dependent upon a successful system of deconcentration of the central government apparatus. There is no empirical evidence to support that hypothesis. To the contrary, in the countries that embarked upon this path, including France, the decentralization process has advanced slowly. This attempt simply imitates the French administrative approach to decentralization. The Mali experiment

started as a political, not an administrative, process and should continue as such. Most administrators are in fact products of the authoritarian period and are themselves obstacles to democratic decentralization.

- The widespread use of symbols (new names and special clothing for administrators) that gives very high visibility to the appointed officials poses problems of imbalance between the two groups, the appointed and the elected officials. This is reminiscent of the colonial era.
- There is also a zero sum game mentality that goes with the process and that portrays any effort at strengthening decentralization as an effort at weakening the old administrative apparatus. There is risk that these developments result in a major lack of support for the decentralization process that could cause serious setbacks to the work of improving local governance and decentralization.
- Finally, the democratic governance principle of checks and balances is totally absent at the regional and local level. The system is set up in such a way that the elected officials have no control over what the appointed officials do in their areas. The latter are only accountable to their superiors in the government and the national agencies. This state of affairs gives the tutelle and the technical services the latitude to act with total impunity and without any local control.

CAPITALIZING ON STRENGTHS

Alongside the above causes for concern, there are many positive developments pertaining to the consolidation of the decentralization reform that are cause for satisfaction and hope and that could be capitalized on.

- First, the demand for democracy and democratic governance among Mali's people is taking root and growing, both in urban and rural settings. It is obvious to everyone that the decentralization process is valued at the grassroots level, that it is working and providing valuable services to the people of Mali. In the words of one elected official, "the decentralized entities ('collectivités') have brought more services to the people in five years than the central government has done in 40 years". This realization has resulted in open support, at the national, regional and local levels, for decentralization and for local governance of development. The president of the country himself has stated that decentralization in Mali is irreversible.
- The second positive development in the decentralization process was the injection of new blood into the process with the large turnover in local officials following the 2004 communal elections. PGP is working today with new officials who are very committed to serving their constituents. Many have decided to stand up and fight to change the mode of governance that prevailed during their predecessors' term of office. These new officials have become key PGP allies in the process. It should be noted that this positive state of affairs is quite the opposite of what was predicted on the eve of the 2004 elections -- that a high turnover and a capacity deficit would constitute a setback.
- The third positive development is the response from some progressive prefects who strongly support the PGP approach and who have approached PGP teams to request that PGP extend its interventions to all of the communes in their circle. PGP will capitalize on this receptiveness to the PGP approach and will continue to work very closely with all officials who display this interest.
- The fourth and major positive development was the GRM's drafting of a 10-year policy document on decentralization, pursuant to a request made by its technical and financial partners at the Geneva Round Table. The document clarifies the objectives of the decentralization process and the roles and responsibilities of the GRM and its financial and technical partners. This document was presented to all interested parties by MATCL officials in a sectoral consultation meeting held in Bamako in February, 2005.
- The creation of an inter-ministerial committee in charge of monitoring the implementation of the Operational Plan for the Transfer of Responsibilities and Resources (Schéma opérationnel de

transfert des compétences et des ressources) is another step in the right direction. The DNCT is in charge of the secretariat of this committee. The establishment of this committee raises hopes that the executive branch is going to fully cooperate with the MATCL/DNCT on the implementation of the transfer plan adopted at the national workshop of October, 2004.

- The implementation of the Institutional Development Program (known in French as “PDI”) with a major decentralization component should also help advance the agenda of consolidating the decentralization process. The program has conducted many studies during the past period on the transfer of responsibilities and resources that will be very helpful in the hands of the CSOs that are prepared to advocate for accelerating this process.
- Another cause for hope is the renewed commitment of the members of the National Assembly (“AN”), the High Council of Territorial Entities (Haut Conseil des Collectivités, or “HCC”), and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (Conseil Economique, Social et Culturel, or “CESC”) to continue pushing in a non-adversarial manner for the transfer of responsibilities and resources and for a more favorable environment to the decentralization process. This is demonstrated in the creation of a forum for consultation (cadre de concertation) by the three institutions and their intention to use it as a watchdog for the promotion of a more favorable environment for decentralization.

B. IMPLEMENTATION STATUS REPORT

I. OBJECTIVE ONE: PARTICIPATION OF KEY COMMUNAL ACTORS IN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE INCREASED IN TARGETED COMMUNES

Results for Objective One are reported under the following five headings: 1) Working toward improved services, 2) open planning and budgeting, 3) resource mobilization, 4) Compliance with procedures and good practices, and 5) conflict prevention and management. Under each heading the PGP will report on activities and achievements and analyze quantitative results.

This section of the report covers inter-related activities and achievements that have in common outreach efforts by communes to tear down walls and establish straightforward, productive relations with constituents and organizations. The vast and general effort made by the great majority of communes in this respect was associated with objectives fundamental to the consolidation of decentralization: participatory planning and budgeting, tax recovery, financial management and reporting. Although activities and results are presented by theme to facilitate reading and analysis, all that is presented below needs to be viewed with a holistic perspective. Greater participation in planning and budgeting, decision-making, along with healthy, transparent management practice, improvements in service delivery and regular reporting are all interdependent.

EASING OFFICIALS ACROSS THE BRIDGE

Newly elected officials in Minidian* found a deep gorge had evolved between themselves and state officials when they tried to register a contract and the communal budget with the Prefect. The obstacle was the product of a series of misunderstandings and a near total absence of communication. To the local officials it seemed nearly impossible to bridge. PGP proposed to commune officials that they begin doing their homework by becoming familiar with applicable laws and regulations. A common base of knowledge and discussions between the parties subsequently generated shared understanding and goodwill that quickly bridged the gap. The normal budget process and construction of infrastructure have since moved forward. This example illustrates both the severe impact of a lack of facilitation and communication at the onset of the decentralization process as well as the substantial gains possible by use of basic facilitation and communication between actors.

* Kangaba cercle, Koulikoro Region

Results from this year indicate promising advances in each of the above expected outputs. The shared governance approach put forward by PGP has revealed its potential. When governance objectives are shared locally, bridges built between partners previously compartmentalized, communications and dialogue initiated and reinforced, many walls come down and the results translate into very concrete dividends.

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

One factor that is worth noting this year is the use of media by communes as a way of keeping connected with constituents scattered over large areas. Ninety-nine communes received PGP support in communications over the last year. Of those, 67 ran radio campaigns on themes ranging from participatory planning, to budget and tax recovery, to sanitation and a host of others. There were 23 campaigns on participatory planning alone. Twenty-seven communes crafted communication plans with PGP support, 22 entered into formal agreements with radio stations and 3 sought funding for community radio. This phenomenon deserves consideration. As media outlets multiply, the opportunity to reach a mass of citizens at little expense grows. Given physical constraints set by the vast size of the country and limited commune resources, media use to share ideas and experience, debate issues and provide valuable information can foster the participation of a much larger mass of constituents. Mindsets and frames of reference should naturally evolve over the coming years. Media use has the potential to greatly widen impact in this regard.

WHO SAYS ELECTED AND STATE OFFICIALS WON'T WORK TOGETHER?

In Kadiana, the mayor's efforts to reach out are paying off. Discussions with the nature conservancy agent have led to a partnership to develop tourism around a grotto with strong natural and cultural assets. With the technical assistance of the agent, a tourism development project was produced and the partners have submitted it to a development agency for funding.

*Kolondieba cercle, Sikasso Region

CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS

Another point of interest is the organizational capacity of CSOs. The capacity of socio-economic groups to understand common interests, organize, advocate and negotiate is an important determinant in the development of local and regional autonomy. Over the past 12 months PGP has provided direct support to organized groups in order to reinforce their participation in communal affairs. The results contributed, among other things, to women's participation in planning and budgeting.

Under Objective One, "increases in participation" includes consideration of the following expected outputs:

- A local citizenry better informed and mobilized, involved in decisions and mindful of the management of resources;
- Local associations including youth, women's groups and cooperatives better equipped to raise issues of concern and make their voices heard;
- Communes managing open planning and budgeting processes leading to priorities that are more closely linked to the most pressing needs of constituents, giving greater consideration to women's needs, more realistic and less influenced by local partisan politics;
- Communes working in partnership with local service delivery associations such as ASACOS and CGSs to ensure buy-in from constituents through open democratic process, more effective planning, resource mobilization and transparent management, and improving their own service delivery through partnerships and private sector involvement;

- Communes playing a greater, more dynamic role in relationship to external development programs active in the commune, as expressed by partnership agreements and communal coordination mechanisms;
- Citizens more willing to pay their taxes as a result of outreach efforts, participation in planning and budgeting, and belief that their tax dollars will be well managed;
- Communes improving their internal workings through regular meetings, sessions, active committees, better financial management and regular reporting; as well as improved revenue collection on public infrastructure and services;
- Communes better able to prevent conflict and intervene when friction arises in order to reduce paralyzing conflicts at the village level and in local service delivery associations.

In reading through this section, it is important to keep in mind that the ultimate success of communes depends not only on the initiatives and achievements of local elected officials, but also on a series of factors over which communes have little or no control: capacity, means and behavior of state officials, fiscal regime, transfers of financial resources, support from sectoral ministries and development agencies. Although the results herein are promising, improvements are unlikely to be consolidated unless there are significant improvements in the above.

THE LONG AND WINDING PIPE TO THE FAUCET

In the mid-90's the GRM instituted a general policy of community management of essential services. In the city of Djenné*, the water users' board, elected in 1999, continued to manage the service after its term had expired in 2002. Change of political leadership in 2004 ushered in a new mayor and led to a general assembly of the association. The board and its followers boycotted the assembly and refused to relinquish power. What followed – an abrupt end to the association's mandate and the appointment of a special commission, boycott of council sessions by the opposition, and a city split in two by political affiliation – threatened the gains made in public participation in water management over the previous six years. KfW (the German Development Bank) conditioned funding for the 2nd phase of Djenné's waterworks project on the resolution of the crisis.

PGP facilitation enabled the Mayor and his opponents to understand that they had a common stake in resolving the crisis. A process ensued by which membership in the association was reviewed and a new board was elected by newly appointed neighborhood delegates. The city remains split politically, as the new board is made up entirely of members of the Mayor's political majority. Nonetheless, the crisis has been resolved and the new board is getting down to business.

* Djenné cercle, Mopti Region

1.1 WORKING TOWARD IMPROVED SERVICES / PARTNERSHIPS

This heading includes activities corresponding to indicators SO3, IR 1.3, IR 3.2, IR 1.4, and IR 1.8.

Service delivery is central to well being, and critical in a country such as Mali. Access to quality services – properly planned and managed – is associated with participation and ownership of those services by community-based organizations. It is also associated by law with communal oversight, facilitation and resources. At present, many community based service delivery organizations face democratic and organizational difficulties, including board renewal, management, and membership. And most are not fully integrated with the local government institution. In order to achieve an increase in public access to quality services, PGP has provided close mentoring to local governments in their efforts to reach out across all sectors in order to establish closer, more productive relations with service delivery organizations. This was often carried out in partnership with sectoral administrations and development agencies.

1.1.1 Activities and achievements

Of the 73 Year 1 communes in which PGP has carried out activities outlined in individual Strategic Partnership Agreements over the past year, 68 communes have initiated outreach efforts to improve services, including 37 in natural resource management (NRM), 7 in health and 16 in education. In the great majority of cases it was the first time the mayor and council members actually met and held discussions with individual service organizations active within their commune. The initiative was most

welcome. It provided participants on both sides with a mutual understanding on which to build. In many cases the commune presented a portrait of communal finances that served as an eye-opening reality check for partners. And the mayor and council now have a much better idea of needs and aspirations across their commune.

This effort by individual communes provides important insight into what communes should be doing and what can happen when they do. In 6 communes the mayor and/or his deputies were involved with PGP and sectoral agents in establishing new associations in water management and education, laying the foundations for further involvement by the commune. In 9 other communes, the mayor was associated in training service organizations and crafting a capacity building program or holding thematic days to generate greater buy-in from his constituents.

There are 21 cases where the outreach led to formalized agreements between the commune and its local service partners, sometimes generating new revenue. Agreements were crafted with women's groups and merchants' associations on market management, sanitation and security, with water users on projected water conveyance, and include 4 agreements in the health sector and 4 in education.

Partnerships for health

FROM 0 TO 460 IN SYNERGY

Keneya Ciwara and PGP field agents together came to a common understanding on the necessity of reviving a failing local health association. They conducted a joint effort to support the Zaniéna* ASACO in establishing closer links with the local population. Result: the ASACO went from 0 members to 460 as soon as the community understood that it was in its best interest to sign up and participate.

* Sikasso cercle and region

The Ministry of Health instituted in 1994 a policy of decentralization and community participation with the creation of community health associations (ASACO) for every community health center (CSCOM). ASACOs are responsible for planning and managing local health services. Presidential decree no 02-314 / P-RM of June 4, 2002, specified the competencies of communes regarding health. These include the adoption of communal planning in public health, funding and maintenance of health infrastructure and equipment, funding salaries of part of CSCOM personnel, and regular control of ASACO accounts. Most ASACOs

today have no formal relationship with the communal institution, although the commune often funds personnel and equipment or infrastructure. Funding for infrastructure is often programmed by the commune and funded through the national agency for local infrastructure (ANICT), and sometimes programmed and funded through sectoral health programs – with little or no effective coordination between the two. The majority of communes do not have the local resource base necessary to fund health equipment and services. ASACOs are challenged with problems of literacy of board members, democratic practice, weak management capacity, and lack of proper accounting and transparent external control.

Of the 73 Year 1 communes in which PGP has carried out activities outlined in individual Partnership Agreements over the past year, 8 communes have initiated outreach efforts in health. The efforts led to a better understanding between communal officials and the local ASACO, capacity building plans in two instances, one board renewal and one instance of reform (adoption of transparency policy on prices).

Partnership between the commune and ASACOs can only be beneficial. In one commune, the mayor's involvement together with PGP led to a turnaround for an ASACO that had no members (see box). In another, the ASACO – now working hand-in-hand with the mayor – secured the services of a state-funded doctor for the health center. In 2 communes PGP support led to the mobilization of women's associations in polio vaccination campaigns. Achieving significant results under health will require a closely coordinated approach between the USAID-funded *Keneya Ciwara* project, the Ministry of Health and PGP.

In certain regions, Keneya Ciwara agents have jointly addressed the issue of communal control of public resources managed by ASACOs and the issue has been debated in communal fora. Open and transparent management, along with clear and respected rules regarding external financial controls, is a basic condition for sustainable access to health care. In a setting with so few resources, mismanagement can make the difference between service and no service at all.

Partnerships for education

At the time of Mali's independence, the Education Ministry delegated part of the responsibility for the management of schools to local parent-teacher associations (APE). Decree no. 02-313 / P-RM, dated June 4, 2002, defined the commune's competencies regarding primary education. These include planning for communal needs, primary school management (through school management committees), infrastructure construction and maintenance, staff recruitment. In 2004, the Ministry modified the participatory framework for school management through decree no. 0469 MEN-SG, transferring

management responsibility from parent-teacher associations to school management committees (CGSs). Many problems have been encountered locally in establishing the CGSs. In some instances, the Ministry establishes CGSs directly, bypassing the commune. In most, the CGSs are not yet established, or lack the facilitation and mentoring necessary to become operational and effective. Numerous schools are plagued by conflict arising out of the transfer of management responsibility from the parent-teachers associations to the CGSs.

Of the 73 Year 1 communes in which PGP has carried out activities outlined in individual Partnership Agreements over the past year, 18 communes have initiated outreach efforts in education. Six mayors were closely involved in events organized around education and/or in village-level consultations on education initiated by the commune. Commune involvement led to the resolution of at least 2 conflicts (see box), the signing of 4 partnership agreements, one CGS making official reports to the council and one board renewal. PGP and the commune were involved in the establishment of one CGS and piloted a drastic change of approach in the establishment of several others. In Sirakola commune, thanks to PGP involvement, particular attention was given to gender in the establishment of 32 CGSs: in all 32 there are at least 2 women on the board, without exception.

Given the sheer number of primary schools and their often remote locations, the ability of the commune to intervene effectively to ensure proper management of resources, organizational effectiveness and democratic process within CGS, as well as provision of much needed infrastructure and staff, is paramount. This raises issues regarding the transfer of financial resources, communal staffing, as well as the conditions under which technical support from Ministry officials can become commonplace.

Partnerships for water

The PGP and the West Africa Water Initiative (WAWI) have collaborated closely throughout the reporting period. WAWI participated in the orientation of the PGP field staff in three regions, making presentations on the water sector. The PGP worked to identify potential water system sites in its target

A NEW SCHOOL OF THOUGHT

Education resources in rural areas are scarce. Yet conflict between Warana Sokoro (Bamanan) and Warana Dialloso (Peul) villages, in Sikasso Region, forced Warana Sokoro children to walk 14 kilometers beyond Warana Dialloso to the next school, causing children to drop out early on. The Zaniéna* mayor successfully mediated the conflict with PGP support and counsel, and now children share a school close to home. All schools are now to be run by locally-elected management committees, taking over that responsibility from existing parent teacher associations. Easing the transition and involving parents will require facilitation and conflict resolution skills like those demonstrated in Warana. Yet in neighboring Niéna Commune, education officials elected to set up the management committees unilaterally and hurriedly. Fortunately for the kids, officials recognized they had made a mistake and in discussions with the mayor and the PGP agent, they started the process over again with a sound participatory approach. And Niéna schools can now count on a mayor that knows how to intervene when necessary. It's never too late to learn.

* Sikasso cercle and Region

communes. More recently, the two programs have been involved in a promising partnership within the framework of a Global Development Alliance (GDA) agreement between the Coca Cola Company (TCCC) and USAID. Resources have been available for the development of water systems in communes where WAWI and PGP overlap. USAID, GTEF, WAWI and PGP staff have been heavily involved in all aspects of the management of this GDA project.

The WAWI and PGP staffs have worked together to plan and implement the GDA project, identifying the commune sites and the civil society partners. During the recent visit of TCCC officials to Mali, WAWI and PGP organized meetings with commune councils and NGOs, took the TCCC officials on tours of the potential project sites, and assisted the host country partners in the preparation of proposals.

The GDA project has provided the PGP with a wonderful opportunity. It has enabled the PGP team to build the capacities of commune partners in proposal writing, in accordance with the PGP principle of encouraging learning by doing, and to demonstrate the importance of shared governance through the implementation of a program that will improve the quality of life for the communities that are impacted.

Natural Resource Management

PGP developed a tool based on the Nature, Wealth and Power (NWP) framework for use by communes in natural resource management. The tool can help communes in two ways:

- Foster dialogue on natural resource management with other entities, thereby raising awareness of NRM among elected officials, and facilitate the emergence of a local vision of NRM;
- Help focus elected officials on the impact of NRM on local livelihoods. Natural resources are very closely linked to local revenue, and proper management of those resources is thus linked to the economic viability of each commune.

DOWN THE TRAIL OF SAND

It is a fact that communes generate little revenue from natural resources. When Kapala commune*, working with PGP help, began taxing sand collected from a pit on its territory, collectors moved down to the next commune, where no tax was collected. Now, Koloningé, Zangasso, Ngoutjina are coming together to share experiences and institute one price for sand wherever one chooses to collect it. Clearly these communes are on the right trail.

* Koutiala cercle. Sikasso Region

With PGP support, communes conducted an analysis of their development plan to identify opportunities in NRM improvements; drew a resources map; analyzed existing local channels for specific resources such as wood; and associated state and other agencies in partnerships.

Of the 73 Year 1 communes in which PGP has carried out activities outlined in individual Partnership Agreements over the past year, over half (38) have initiated outreach efforts in NRM. Most of the initiatives involved the identification of natural resources and local NRM organizations. Commune officials initiated meetings to exchange information and viewpoints with water users' associations, herders' associations, nature conservation officials, forest management associations, individual villages and local agricultural syndicates. Their efforts led to the signing of 6 partnership agreements (8.2% of first year communes), mobilization of significant resources for a communal water management project and 2 new sources of revenue. In 6 communes, officials collaborated with PGP and other partners in establishing new water users associations, and in one commune, discussions led to an inter-communal partnership on the management of a grotto of natural and cultural value.

Communes in Ségou have become much more interested in state nature conservancy services and are inquiring about the share of forestry activity that by law belongs to the commune. PGP is holding meetings with PRODEPAM on synergy in the area of NRM plans and delegation to local associations.

Relations with the Private sector

MINING FOR MICROSOFT

Private enterprise has a vested interest in good local governance over time. That interest was clearly demonstrated by the local chapter of the National Mining Union (UNOMIN) in Minidian.* With over 13,000 residents and responsibility over public records and taxation, Minidian has a legitimate need for computing. With PGP's help the Mayor identified UNOMIN and made its case. The Commune is now equipped with computer and printer, and a promise to UNOMIN to make good use of them.

* Kangaba cercle, Koulikoro Region

Private economic activity in most target communes is usually limited to commerce, small-scale forestry, herding and agriculture. Modern private organizations are mostly agricultural cooperatives managing silos, small mills and specialized commodities. Of notable exception are mining and sugar interests, large agricultural parastatals and cotton cooperatives. Commune relations with the private sector vary considerably in PGP communes. Some cercles fall under the competence of a large scale public agricultural perimeter. Many communes are relatively isolated and do not have a modern private sector to speak of.

Commune advancements regarding the private sector this year fall under three categories: tax recovery, service

provision and goodwill partnerships. In 2 examples from Niono cercle, communes increased revenue when large scale enterprises came under greater scrutiny after commune diagnostics revealed missing pieces in revenue streams (see box). Meetings with cooperatives in Nara², Kéléya³ and Konséguéla⁴ also led to increased revenue from modern private concerns, mainly cooperatives and transport operators.

Outreach efforts by commune officials directed at the private sector also led to mutually advantageous partnerships. In Kolondieba⁵, the cotton parastatal CMDT promised to keep the commune informed of members' payment schedules in order to ease recovery efforts. In Diédougou⁶, as part of their partnership,

SPREADING THE WEALTH

Siribala Commune* never imagined the diagnostic it produced with the help of PGP would benefit surrounding communes as well. The diagnostic revealed significant loss of revenue and led to further inquiry. It turned out the Office du Niger should be paying its taxes not only to the commune where its offices are located but also to all communes in which it operates. PGP helped the commune to prepare the issue and bring it up to the local steering committee (CLO) at the level of Niono cercle. The CLO, in which elected and state officials meet together with development partners, provided a forum for the regional revenue service to discuss the issue with other actors. Eleven communes now share in tax revenue generated by Office du Niger activities. A similar process led the revenue service to begin applying local taxes to the Sukala sugar refinery in Siribala. Ministries have a mixed record in applying laws and regulations evenly and in managing scarce resources properly. Oversight and supervision are lacking. When local actors are able to bring matters forward to higher authority and forums, and other mechanisms create pressure, the entire system benefits.

* Niono cercle, Segou Region

the commune provided assistance to the local CMDT in fighting a caterpillar problem. And in Minidian, the local miner's union donated equipment to facilitate, among other things, fiscal management (see box).

² Nara cercle, Koulikoro region

³ Bougouni cercle, Sikasso region

⁴ Koutiala cercle, Ségou region

⁵ Kolondieba cercle, Sikasso region

⁶ Dioila cercle, Koulikoro region

Private contributions solicited in Bougouni⁷ cercle benefited a women's market-gardening enterprise to the tune of 2 350 00 FCFA (\$4,500). In Yafolila⁸, Bougouni, Wassoulou⁹, the commune has delegated market management to private sector companies.

These achievements are the result of several types of support provided by PGP -- in outreach, in recovery and in activities more specifically targeted to mobilizing contributions from the private sector. Support in the latter was provided to 44 communes and centered on the identification and approach of private concerns operating within communal boundaries.

Communal efforts at coordination

In an effort to strengthen relations with external and local partners and develop synergy, commune officials, assisted by PGP staff, invested themselves in the creation of new -- or revitalization of existing -- local development fora in 66 of the 73 communes with which PGP has a strategic partnership plan. These fora bring around one table the entities that operate within the commune. Information sharing and discussion on local development issues, needs and opportunities is the order of the day. If the bulk of resources invested in the commune were controlled by the communal institution, local fora would likely prosper, and attendance would be a matter of interest and possibly survival for sectoral agents. Given the resources available to the average commune, the reverse is the case. Of the 66 communes in which development fora were established or revived with the help of PGP, 12 communes officially report their fora as still active today. The remaining 54 are either lethargic or inactive.

The problem most often faced by communes in keeping fora alive is per diem policy: participation is often paid, through per diems, including for those participants located in the commune or already covered by their own organization. This sorry state of affairs has evolved through development agency policy on per diems. The standard attitude and operating procedure in all regions is that payment for participation is normal. Thus, participation in many current development activities has become distorted. Development agents' participation is no longer conditioned by duty or by interest related to public function; it is a function of money. PGP has adopted a strict policy regarding per diems. Participation in PGP activities is conditioned strictly by public or professional interest and based on investment in time and effort by participants. This may reduce the number of partners that readily participate, but those that do are truly committed, and will, in time, influence others.

1.1.2 Quantitative results

Indicator Number	Indicator	USAID baseline	PGP baseline	(USAID) target FY 05	Overall Results FY 05	Results in Year 1 Com-munes	Results in Year 2 Com-munes
SO3	% of Communes with Partnerships that Increase Services	30%	61%	36%	52%	56%	50%
	Education	n/a			24.0%	n/a	
	Health	n/a			21.2%	n/a	

⁷ Sikasso region

⁸ Yafolila cercle, Sikasso region

⁹ Yanfolila cercle, Sikasso region

Indicator Number	Indicator	USAID baseline	PGP baseline	(USAID) target FY 05	Overall Results FY 05	Results in Year 1 Com-munes	Results in Year 2 Com-munes
	Water	n/a			18.8%	n/a	
	NRM	n/a			16.4%	n/a	
	Economy	n/a			23.6%	n/a	
IR 1.3	% of Communes that have addressed development needs through joint action	53%	40%	55%	40%	42 %	38 %
	Education	n/a			18.4%		
	Health	n/a			9.6%	n/a	
	Water	n/a			14.8%	n/a	
	NRM	n/a			8.8%	n/a	
	Economy	n/a			11.2%	n/a	
IR 1.8	% of communes with written NRM Agreements	none	none	none	9%	10,96%	8,47%
IR 1.4	% Communes Leveraged Resources From Private Sector For Public Goods/Services	6%	7%	7%	1,20%	1 commune	2 communes

1.1.3 Analysis

PGP's survey of 250 target communes in September of this year yielded a result of 52% for communes where partnerships increase delivery of social services. The value is significantly above the USAID baseline (30%) and target performance for this year (36%). It is, however, below the baseline established internally by PGP in September 2004. This is explained by a distortion: in 2004, field agents included newly signed partnership agreements with PGP in the tally. The skew was discovered after data for FY04 had been reported. This problem has been corrected, as reflected in the drop recorded this year. This is consistent with results for indicator 1.3, which measures the number of communes in which joint action was undertaken. Since PGP was conducting internal communal diagnostics and had not yet undertaken concrete actions on the ground with the communes in September, 2004, the project was not counted as having addressed a development problem. There was no distortion. Accordingly, the drop in SO3 is not reflected in IR 1.3.

Of particular interest in this year's results is the 6 point spread between first year communes (56%) and new communes (50%). This is consistent with results under IR 1.3 showing a 4 point spread between first year communes and new communes. Both indicators point to increases in partnerships between communes in which PGP has been active for one year and those where it has only recently completed preliminary diagnostics.

While the SO3 indicator measures all signed partnerships, IR 1.3 measures only partnerships that have led to concrete actions in the given year. This may explain why the internal baseline value for IR 1.3 is lower than for the SO3 indicator. Activities agreed to under signed agreements may start up several months after the agreement is finalized. Other signed agreements relate to permanent services (such as education or

health) for which there may not be visible “concrete actions” (such as building a school or running a vaccination campaign) in any given year.

While the drafting of written agreements is considered a sign of maturity in managing institutional and economic relationships, several factors are slowing down the process, including: 1) traditional agreements in rural areas are not in written form; 2) a significant percentage of mayors are either illiterate or have not benefited from secondary education ; 3) written agreements are of a more binding and transparent nature with which mayors and other actors are often not at ease ; 4) an important number of development agencies do not view the commune as a valuable partner and do not seek to associate it in their objectives or activities.

External factors

In assessing results on IR 1.3, one must be aware that results are influenced by outside factors such as the arrival and departure of partners, which modifies the total number of partners with which a given commune can formalize a partnership. With changes in levels of foreign aid and in strategic regional focus, results for indicators SO3 and IR 1.3 can be influenced by factors outside the realm of partnerships. Thus, the first hypothesis that can be derived from the data – based on PGP’s internal baseline – is that funding levels most probably remained similar for the years 2004 and 2005 in PGP target communes (40% in 2004 and 2005).

It is noteworthy that many development project designs do not include partnership with communal authorities. Although the law confers to the communes the overall competence for local development (93-008) and clearly defines their competencies in health, education and water management (Decrees 02-313 to 315 / P-RM), agencies working in communes often do not enter into partnership with the institution. Partnership with communal authorities is often considered an obstacle that slows down implementation and provides no immediate or visible return. Changes in sectoral project design regarding the role that should be played by the communes could also impact significantly results under indicators SO3 and IR 1.3.

Health and Education

Baseline results in the number of communes that have formal agreements with either APEs/CGSs (24.0%) or ASACOs (21.2%) are telling of the distance covered since the 2002 decrees on commune competence in education and health. Given that communes have similar responsibilities and contributions in supporting APEs/CGSs and ASACOs, the fact that fewer communes have formal agreements with ASACOs as opposed to APEs/CGSs is significant. A standard partnership format exists, but apparently is not put into general practice by ministry officials in the field. In the coming year, advancements will be measured both by the number of communes that have formal agreements but also, by the nature and depth of the partnership.

CROCODILE TEARS

Seems the crocodiles in Katioloni (Zégoua commune*) are crying real crocodile tears. The sacred area they occupy is drying up and young crocks are moving to swamplier pastures where they are easy prey to more cunning creatures. With the help of PGP, the mayor is paying attention and restoration of the area is part of the commune’s NRM plans. The water hole will be dug deeper, and species will be introduced to provide the crocodiles with sufficient food. The crocodiles are highly valued by the locals for their mystical powers – and not for handbags.

* Kadiola cercle, Sikasso Region

Natural Resource Management

The reported number of communes with partnerships for water management is only 2.4 points below that for health. Water users’ associations entered into partnerships in 18.8% of communes, as opposed to 21.2% for ASACOs, per IR1.3. Transfer of competence over water – and by the same token oversight of water users’ associations – is not yet significant. The great majority of equipment is still under state

control. This contrasts with health and education, where the commune programs investment and ensures maintenance of buildings. It would seem that the spread should be greater.

Only 16.4% of communes report formal partnerships in NRM under SO3. In assessing the significance of this value, it is important to keep in mind that communes vary greatly in geographical, topographical and climatological characteristics. Many do not have the resources that warranted – from a programming perspective – the delegation of competencies to associations. A 20% sample of inventories conducted in first year communes in FY2004 yielded not a single NRM association. Another factor to consider is that NRM groups are geographically scattered. Generating their participation is more costly than for associations located in the commune capital. Data on NRM thus underlines further the delays in formalization of commune-ASACO relations in this regard.

In order to provide a framework that facilitates the integration of governance considerations into sectoral activities, an additional indicator on the number of NRM partnerships was introduced this year (IR 1.8). The baseline is 28 agreements out of 250 communes (11.2%). The number is somewhat lower than that of communes reporting formalized partnership agreements in NRM under SO3 (16.4%). Given the fact that any given commune can have more than one agreement, the number for IR 1.8 should be greater than that for SO3. Understanding of this distortion will require further inquiry.

Private sector

The sharp drop in the number of communes reporting private contributions is due to a distortion in last year's data collection. In 2004, agents included contributions from the diaspora as modern private sector contributions. This skew has been corrected in 2005 and current values are a more correct reflection of reality. The values from 2005 are consistent with information from activity reports. Although PGP has made significant progress regarding public-private relations and partnership, results will remain a factor of the importance of modern economic activity in target communes. The project will continue to seek opportunities for synergy with PRODEPAM and other USAID implementing partners.

I.2. OPEN PLANNING AND BUDGETING

This heading includes activities corresponding to indicators: IRs 1.1, 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.7, 1.7.1, and 3.2.

Processes by which a commune seeks input, prioritizes and programs public investment have a bearing not only on ownership by constituents, but also on well being of the most disadvantaged groups within the community. In an environment in which resources are scarce and needs are legion, investment programming can be an intensive political contest between parties and between elected officials. Under the right conditions, traditional social values regarding equity and community can be expressed, and resources invested where there is greatest need.

Planning and budgeting need also be considered as a formidable learning opportunity for constituents traditionally kept in the dark. There is one thing illiterate people can do: count. And when given the numbers behind their economic and administrative condition, they can act and react. Opaque public administration has enabled a significant portion of meager resources to be channeled out of public service delivery. Wide participation in planning and budgeting can be considered as a natural first step in claiming back public resources for the benefit of populations facing extreme poverty.

PGP has invested considerable energy and resources in the past 24 months to ensure that the 2005 commune development plans reflect a process that involves village level public expression of needs, technical and program input by sectoral public services and agencies, open process in prioritization and public information on the outcome. This was achieved in very close synergy with other development partners. At the same time, PGP has counseled and assisted commune officials in generating substantial participation in the 2004 and 2005 budget processes.

1.2.1 Activities and achievements

The communal planning process in 2005

Five years ago the planning process was largely limited to the communal executive, sometimes associated with the council. Villages, local associations, service delivery organizations were not involved or informed. The plan was crafted *for* the commune by consultants, generally with no commune involvement in surveying and little or no involvement at the village level or by CSOs.

The 2005 process – coordinated at the cercle level by the Commune Advisory Centers (CCC) – brought together multiple actors working in synergy to reach the objective of conducting the planning process in all 703 communes. PGP staff was actively involved in crafting participatory methodology and mechanisms for prioritization, establishing local planning committees, counseling commune officials on mobilization, on media use and on conducting village consultations.

In the 192 communes where PGP played an active role in participatory planning this year, the process was conducted largely by members of the executive and council, as well as by state officials in certain instances. PGP was instrumental in establishing local surveying committees, some with as many as 33 members spread out at the village level to inventory needs. In at least 30 communes the committees held general village assemblies. In communes where participation data was reported, 70% of elected officials on average participated in planning activities that reached 81% of villages on average. In 16 communes, inter-village fora enabled people from adjoining villages to come together, identify issues of common concern and prioritize needs. Participation in the commune capital for the launch, prioritization exercise and communication of results reached 56 persons on average, 12% of whom were women. Rough estimates provide a total of 17,600 people participating in planning processes held in PGP target communes.

PGP stressed women's participation at all stages of the process. In at least 42 communes out of 192 (22%) special consideration was given to women's needs. In some cases women were members of surveying committees and women's groups adopted action plans to identify their own needs. This is considered to be the result of widened participation and special consideration given to the participation of women and women's associations in the planning process.

Public participation in budgeting

Participation in the budget process is a fundamental exercise that lays the groundwork for improved tax recovery and, eventually, greater scrutiny in local management of scarce resources. Budgeting is the annual exercise by which a commune identifies resources, programs investment according to its 5-year plan, identifies fixed expenses and available surplus (if any). Communes are required by law to hold public consultations before adoption by the council, and publish reports at year's end. Communal resources are largely insufficient. Any surplus is usually earmarked for externally-financed investments for which the institution must contribute 10% to 20% of total value – unless crafty ways of going around funding conditions are found.

Over the course of the last 12 months, field agents invested considerable time and energy helping the commune share information on its budget with its constituents and partners. The activity was conducted in 174 out of 250 communes (70%). Communicating and debating on the budget was often combined with efforts at improving tax recovery. The activity led to a flurry of field visits, debates, and public presentations of financial results. In at least 27 communes officials toured most villages holding public meetings to inform constituents of the financial realities of the commune and the budget process. Twelve communes used media to increase participation in budgetary sessions. At least 15 communes report holding official public debates at the commune level. In 60 communes officials reported publicly on

expenditures, 11 of them at the village level. In Zaniéna¹⁰ alone, 537 constituents participated in discussions organized around financial reporting at the village level. The impact of this activity will be tracked in terms of increases in recovery rates and in sustained efforts by communes to continue to hold public consultations. Public participation at communal sessions will also be tracked.

Participation by women

Data collected over 250 communes this year point to a total of 148 communes that target investments and/or activities specifically to women's needs (IR 3.2: 59.2%). This marks a 39.1% increase over the internal PGP baseline of 2004 (36%) and places the result 14.2 points above the USAID target for this year. The value is slightly higher for first year communes (65%) as opposed to new communes (57.6%).

1.2.2 Quantitative Results

Indicator Number	Indicator	USAID baseline	PGP baseline	(USAID) target FY 05	Overall Results FY 05	Year 1 Com-munes	Year 2 Com-munes
IR 1.1	% of Communes where annual budgets reflect CDP priorities	63%	56%	63%	66%	67%	66%
IR 1.1.1	% of communes in which communities participate in CDP	n/a	53%	n/a	77%	86%	74%
IR 1.7	% of Communes That Consulted CSOs During CDP Process *	n/a			85,20%	88%	84,75%
IR 1.1.2	% of communes in which communities participate in the preparation of the communal budget	n/a	27%	n/a	20%	25%	18%
IR 1.7.1	% of Communes That Consulted CSOs During Budgeting Process *	n/a			64.00%	65.75%	63.28%
IR 3.2	% of Communes where activities target women's needs	32%	36%	45%	59,20%	65%	57,06%

Indicator Number	Indicator	USAID baseline	PGP baseline	(USAID) target FY 05	Overall Results FY 05	Year 1 Com-munes	Year 2 Com-munes
IR 1.7	% of Communes That Consulted CSOs During CDP Process *	n/a			86%	88%	85%
	Education	n/a			66.8%	n/a	
	Health	n/a			63.6%	n/a	
	Water	n/a			20.0%	n/a	
	NRP	n/a			27.2%	n/a	
	Economy	n/a			56.8%	n/a	

¹⁰ Sikasso cercle and region

Indicator Number	Indicator	USAID baseline	PGP baseline	(USAID) target FY 05	Overall Results FY 05	Year 1 Com-munes	Year 2 Com-munes
IR 1.7.1	% of Communes That Consulted CSOs During Budgeting Process *	n/a			64.40%	65.75%	63.28%
	Education	n/a			44.4%	n/a	
	Health	n/a			41.6%	n/a	
	Water	n/a			11.2%	n/a	
	NRP	n/a			16.4%	n/a	
	Economy	n/a			34.8%	n/a	

1.2.3 Analysis

Data for 2005 under IR 1.1 indicates a 15% increase over internal baseline in the number of communes in which annual investment programming reflects 5-year planning priorities. This performance is 3 points above the USAID performance target for the period. First year and new communes have almost identical values, at 67 and 66% respectively. The increase is consistent with results and achievements reported this year in activity reports. The principal factor contributing to the increase is support provided by PGP to the overall budget process in 174 communes. Thanks to PGP support, communes produced annual investment programs that refer back to the commune development plan. Considering the low level of participation in the planning process in 2000 and the significant advancements in the 2005 process, values for FY2006 should increase further. As participation in planning and budgeting increases, consistency between planned priorities and annual investment programming should also increase.

Participation in planning and budgeting

Thirty-one percent more communes report having public participation in the planning process (IR 1.1.1) this year over last. This is consistent with the level of effort outlaid to reinforce participatory processes. There is a 12 point difference between the number of first year communes that report public participation in the process (86.3%) and that of new communes (74%). Support was provided equally to all target communes in participatory planning. The difference in results between first year and new communes may be a reflection of the impact of support in general outreach activities provided since September, 2004 to first year communes.

The table presents a striking difference between participation in planning (IR 1.1.1: 77%) and budgeting (IR 1.1.2: 20%). The difference is due to the fact that the value for planning (IR 1.1.1) refers to 2005, when intensive support was provided. The value for budgeting (IR 1.1.2) refers to the 2004 budget, which was adopted in late 2003, a period in which PGP was not operational. As for the 7-point drop between 2004 and 2005 data (IR 1.1.2), there is insufficient data for analysis. The 2004 data refers to participation on the 2003 budget, which took place in late 2002.

Data on CSO participation in planning and budgeting, collected for the first time this year, show relatively high values for CSO participation, at 85.2 and 64% for planning and budgeting respectively. The 21.2 point difference between planning and budgeting has the same explanation as that for public participation: the value for planning refers to 2005, when intensive support was provided; the value for budgeting refers to the 2004 budget, which was adopted in late 2003.

Why did 64% of communes include CSOs in budgeting (IR 1.7.1) while only 20% of them sought public participation (IR 1.1.2)? One possible explanation for the 44 point spread is criteria and measurement. For a commune to be counted as having consulted CSOs, one consultation of any one CSO suffices. In contrast, for a commune to be considered as having community participation in budgeting, a minimum of 3 clear instances in which participation took place is necessary.

Education and health

Participation by local service delivery associations in planning and budgeting was relatively high, averaging 65.2% for health and education in planning (with a 3.2 point spread) and 43% in budgeting (with a 2.8 point spread). Participation levels are similar for education and health. Although it is not possible at this time to produce an exact inventory of health and education investments included in the 2005 development plans, 33 communes do report health and education investments and in 7 communes it is linked to participation of CSOs in the planning process. The total for both is probably greater since investment planning information is not systematically reported.

As for an assessment of the impact of CSO participation on planning priorities, one needs to exercise caution. Under ideal circumstances, a commune prioritizes investment according to greatest perceived need across the villages that compose it. Sectoral input into the process can shed light on certain areas, underlining problems that may not be readily apparent to constituents and officials. It is important to remember, however, that the process is inter-sectoral. Greater involvement by service associations in health, for example, will not necessarily lead to more communal investments in health, and nor should it.

Water users and NRM

Reported participation for water and natural resource management was significantly lower than for health and education. Water users' associations participated in planning in only 20% of communes, and in budgeting in only 11.2% of communes. As mentioned above, water users' associations, for the most part, do not have any links with the commune. Transfer of competence over water – and, consequently, oversight of water users' associations – is not yet significant. On a more practical plane, water users' associations are spread out in villages and may not be present in the commune capital, where one can most probably find a school and a health center. The cost of participation is higher for water users' associations.

Only 27.2% of communes report NRM associations participating in planning; and 16.4% report NRM participation in budgeting. As mentioned under IR1.3, in assessing the significance of these values it is important to keep in mind that communes vary greatly in their natural resource profile. Many do not have the resources that would have warranted – from a programming perspective – the delegation of competencies to associations. Moreover, from the perspective of NRM, assessing participation requires that a portion of communes which report participation by groups under “economy” be considered under NRM. Herder and fishermen associations, closely involved with natural resources, have been inventoried as “economic groups” but clearly straddle NRM as well.

Lower values for participation in budgeting (20 points below planning) can be explained in part by the attention given in general to the 2005 planning exercise. Planning in 2005 determines investment priorities over 5 years and is a prerequisite for ANICT funding. Commune officials, PGP staff, CCC

operators and several partners joined forces to produce the plan this year, giving it priority over many other considerations.

Participation by women

The relatively high numbers need to be adjusted to reflect programming external to the communal institution. Out of 50 questionnaires surveyed randomly (20% sample), 80% of cases reflected activities clearly or likely linked to external programming. Twenty percent of cases were clearly or likely linked to communal initiative. If this ratio is applied to the 59.2% value, one can assume that approximately 12% of communes have programmed investments and activities addressing women's needs. This value is more consistent with information contained in PGP reports, with 42 cases in 192 communes where special consideration was given to women's needs in participatory planning or budgeting. The 7.4 point difference between first year and new communes can be partly explained by general PGP activities in first year communes. PGP support in outreach activities to women's groups in first year communes increased women's visibility and participation in communal affairs.

GROWING SPUNK

In Fatoma* the notion that women hesitate to speak up has evaporated. When men from the community tried to challenge one of the women's priorities – a wall to protect the community garden they tend – the women threatened to walk straight out of the meeting if their priorities were not given greater consideration. The garden wall won in the end.

* Mopti cercle and region

This analysis underlines the importance of differentiating between communal investment programming and external programming. It is nonetheless noteworthy that, according to activity reports, a quarter of all communes do pay attention to the needs of women – mostly through limited support to economic activities managed by women. The figure does not necessarily indicate that communes are not sensitive to women's needs. Rather, it is indicative of their extremely marginal financial capacity to program. The ability of communes to provide support to women's activities remains as limited as the commune's means.

I.3 RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

This heading includes activities corresponding to indicator IR 1.6.

The level at which a given commune is able to mobilize resources measures legitimacy and credibility of the institution. Key factors that have an impact on resource mobilization include public participation in planning and budgeting, regular exchange and information flows between commune officials and constituents, relations between the commune and village chiefs, local perceptions regarding the quality and transparency of financial management, and enforcement. Other factors independent of commune officials also impact on recovery rates, the most important being household livelihood security. Regular electoral contests also impact significantly on the capacity – and willingness – of commune officials to press forward with tax issues. Indeed, this political phenomenon can be observed around the world.

1.3.1 Activities and achievements

Collecting the Development Tax (TDRL)

The TDRL is a head tax paid by all constituents, with notable exemptions related to age, number of children and people in uniform. Collection is heavily dependent on village and neighborhood chiefs, whose legitimacy and relative power can make or break efforts at improving collection rates. Although the amount of tax is small (\$2.70 on average), poorer constituents often have to borrow to honor payment. Recovery data includes other local taxes collected directly by the commune on cattle, vehicles and firearms once a year, along with the TDRL.

Over the last 12 months, PGP provided support to communes to review tax inventories and estimate revenue, craft recovery strategies and reach out to taxpayers. This was made possible by intensive training of field agents between October, 2004 and January, 2005. Every PGP agent received five days of training on budget, control mechanisms and state approval, acquisitions and resource mobilization. This section focuses on achievements on recovery; financial management activity is reported in section 1.4.1.

PGP provided a total of 102 communes with specific support on tax recovery. Most of these communes made significant efforts to review tax revenue inventory, reach out to constituents and inform them of financial realities and local taxes. More than a quarter conducted general assemblies at the village level, sometimes reaching all villages, using their own means. Many renewed or strengthened relations with village and neighborhood chiefs. In Kadiolo and Zégoua¹¹ the recovery strategy came from the village chiefs themselves. At least 10 communes made use of media specifically on recovery, to widen their reach, and 11 used public fora to rally forces around recovery. In 6 reported cases, state officials lent a helping hand in local debates and, occasionally, enforcement.

In 48 communes, reports point to direct impact on recovery of 2004 and 2005 taxes. Outreach by officials caused an immediate and substantial jump in many cases. Tienfala¹² constituents owed 9.3 million in back taxes. After outreach efforts by commune officials, 7.3 million of the 9.3 was collected. In Téné¹³, officials had collected 108,000 in 11 months – and collected 12.3 million in 15 days following the mayor's campaign. In Tominian¹⁴ and Niamana¹⁵, tax collectors previously averaging 90,000 per month now report collecting the same amount in a single day.

In many instances, conflict or dysfunctional relations between commune officials and villages and information deficits explain low recovery. PGP

WHEN THINGS ACTUALLY WORK AS THEY SHOULD

Civil servants in Niafunké got a big surprise this year when they found themselves enrolled to pay the local development tax, something none of them could remember ever happening. What they didn't realize is that state officials and mayors had gotten together in Niafunké cercle to talk about decentralization and together decided the enrolment of civil servants was a very good idea – as well as a legal imperative. The Soboundou council quickly approved the mayor's plan to go ahead and local state services obliged by providing complete lists of all their agents in the field. 162 civil servants have so far paid up 141,750 CFA (\$272). They are still wondering what exactly happened. The Deputy Mayor of Soboundou* summed it up rather well when he said: ***“The real satisfaction comes from the symbiosis between the commune and state officials. This represents a big step forward in participation and partnership between communal actors, and one must not forget PGP's catalyzing role.”***

*Soboundou commune, Niafunké cercle, Timbuktu region

THE STORY OF M. HOLEINPOCKET

In Diabaly* the commune had collected the amount of 4000 FCFA in five months of weekly livestock trading at the communal market. With support from PGP, the mayor conducted a quick inventory. He multiplied the average number of cattle sold by the sales tax and came up with quite a different amount. Now the market contributes 6000 FCFA weekly to the commune coffers. The difference is thirty fold. By applying a new management approach to market tax collectors, the mayor doesn't have to monitor every sale. Collectors and the commune know how much must be delivered, every week. Hole is fixed.

*Niono cercle, Ségou Région

¹¹ Kadiolo cercle, Sikasso region

¹² Koulikoro cercle and region

¹³ San cercle, Ségou region

¹⁴ Tominian cercle, Ségou region

¹⁵ San cercle, Ségou region

support was instrumental in reestablishing critical links between commune officials and village/neighborhood chiefs and the people.

Reestablishing links often creates a sudden surge in revenue. Transforming newly generated goodwill into sustained increases in revenue is now the challenge.

Other revenue streams

Tax on markets and other services are not calculated into indicator IR 1.6. Improvements in tax collection in this area are nonetheless important and an indicator of good management practice. This year, out of 104 communes in which PGP provided recovery support, 18 communes conducted fiscal inventories to see exactly what potential resources there were. In 13 cases, communes increased revenue or initiated new revenue streams, including 4 in natural resources. To do so communes established or strengthened management arrangements with associations, private operators, transporters, water users and others. As can be seen in the adjacent box, what they found was sometimes hair-raising. It was also revealing, in terms of common financial management practices. PGP will continue to assist communes in fostering transparent management practices in infrastructure, services and natural resources. Results will ultimately measure the ability of communities to manage themselves, be reasonably self-sufficient, and prosper.

WHEN THE COUNCIL PUTS ITS FOOT DOWN

Councils are infamous for low attendance and politicking. But with input on financial management from PGP, the Léré* Council got down to business. It asked to see the revenue agent's financial report along with the mayor's administrative report. That's the law. Problem is, the state revenue agent's report is seldom available, for many reasons. For one, communal revenue deposited with the Treasury doesn't sit still. Monies are often shifted around according to need and opportunity. In some reported instances, Treasury agents must allegedly be bribed to pay commune money out. The council refused to adopt the mayor's report without seeing the revenue agent's report first. If one can imagine a great mass of city councils all around the country doing the same, the state would feel great pressure to reform the Treasury. This first step, taken in Léré, is an important one. And now the same thing has happened in a second commune, Koumaira*.

* Niafunké cercle, Timbuktu Region

1.3.2 Quantitative results on IR 1.6

Indicator Number	Indicator	USAID baseline	PGP Baseline	(USAID) target FY 05	Overall Results FY 05	Yr 1 Comm.	Yr 2 Comm.
IR 1.6	% of Communes Where Tax Collection Increases Yearly	64%	44%	64%	47%	45%	48%

1.3.3 Analysis

The encouraging activity results reported above must be balanced against political and economic factors that occurred in 2004, namely communal elections, drought and the largest locust invasion in 16 years. The latter impacted on the 2004 harvest and continues to have an impact on livelihoods in 2005. Communal elections in the first half of 2004 served as an impediment to any significant effort at tax collection. In rural areas, which represent the greater portion of target communes, three out of four people live in poverty, and more than one in four lives in extreme poverty.¹⁶ One out of every three children suffers from stunted growth.¹⁷ In such an environment, constituents' ability to pay even a limited amount

¹⁶ Cadre stratégique de lutte contre la pauvreté, GRM, 2002

¹⁷ Liens entre la nutrition infantile et la croissance agricole au Mali : Un résumé des premiers résultats. James Tefft et al. USAID, 2003

of tax will remain fragile and open to climatic and other factors. Several officials declared that they simply could not ask their constituents for taxes at such a time. A total of 17 PGP communes received food aid this year.

Also at issue is enforcement. While enforcement was systematic before 1992, state authorities generally no longer intervene. When they do so, it is at the bequest of the commune, which has to outlay considerable resources to pay daily per diems to policemen. This is representative of relations between state officials and communes. This hidden service fee drastically reduces the level of support that can be provided by state officials across sectors. It is unlikely that good recovery rates can be maintained unless participation and transparent management (the carrot) is completed by enforcement (the stick).

Forty-seven percent of communes report having increased collection rates this year, a 3 point increase over PGP's internal baseline of 44%. This value is 17 points below USAID's performance target for the period. Surprisingly, a greater percentage of new communes (48%) than first year communes (45%) saw revenue increase. This is due to the fact that first year communes renewed their fiscal inventory, often leading to much higher target figures for recovery. In seven first year communes, revenue actually increased, but not the recovery rate. If we factor in those seven communes where revenue increased, the result for first year communes becomes 55%, seven points above new communes. Also notable is the change in recovery rate in those communes that report an increase. Analysis of the data points to a significant increase in revenue in most of the 32 communes that reported an increase in the recovery rate.

1.4 COMPLIANCE WITH PROCEDURES AND GOOD PRACTICES

This heading includes activities corresponding to indicator IR 1.2.

Healthy management practice and transparency are definite requisites for sustainable local resource mobilization. But the ability of communes to manage bears on much more. The commune by definition and law is the focal point of health and education, natural resource management and agricultural production. The institution will not be in a position to be a catalyst and facilitator until it masters its own management. And to do so the basics have to be in place: competent staff properly remunerated, regular sessions and executive meetings, functioning committees, record keeping, and adherence to legal procedures and mechanisms in public accounting for communes.

1.4.1 Activities and achievements

Internal mechanisms

Over the last 12 months, PGP worked with 100 communes to improve the basic internal workings of the institution. The results are encouraging. Almost half of the communes (47) instituted committees in

COMMUNE ON TRIAL CONDEMNED TO DO BETTER

The mayor in Diédougou* got the shakes when PGP proposed that he report budget implementation numbers publicly. He was afraid he would find himself on trial, which is in fact what happened. His constituents demanded clarifications on expenses under the "public events" line item, given the fact that there had been no such events. They also questioned the 52 trips taken by the mayor in a single quarter. The meeting ended with a call for the Mayor to significantly reduce his travel schedule and to broadcast a summary of the meeting on local radio as a way to inform all citizens. The Mayor noted that citizens were quite satisfied with the openness with which the meeting had been conducted. The mayor felt he too had gained something in the meeting: some useful proposals to improve tax collection and resource management. He thanked PGP for the trial and the end credits rolled. In its effort to increase citizens' participation in communal affairs and to promote the notion of accountability of elected local officials, PGP has encouraged mayors to hold public sessions to update their constituents on budget implementation status. Creating such opportunities is particularly important given the widespread lack of confidence in local government.

* Dioïla cercle, Koulikoro region

finance, health, education and other sectors. In at least 36% of cases (17 communes), some or all committees are reported as active. The most active committee is finance. In Bankass¹⁸, the finance committee took the lead in efforts to increase recovery. In Bougouni¹⁹ the committee carried out an inventory of tenants in communal dwellings and convened faulty tax payers – the committee alone recovered 500,000 FCFA (\$961).

Twenty-one communes report regular meetings of the executive and council sessions; some have introduced quarterly activity plans; others, rules of procedure or codes of conduct. Some have improved record keeping. Results vary by region. In the North, where nomadic pastoralist activity dominates, regular meetings will remain problematic. Moreover, attendance during council sessions remains low. The practice of proxy voting enables councilors to receive their stipend for the session despite being absent. Although active committees are a key component in any attempt to build closer links between the communal institution and sectoral issues and service delivery, the commune's capacity to finance the functioning of committees, through stipends, is not assured. More will be known on the potential and role of committees as communes progress in relationship-building with service delivery associations, herders, villagers and development partners.

Financial management

As mentioned above, PGP has invested considerable time and energy to provide every field agent with a working knowledge on all aspects of communal financial management. Beyond that, PGP's financial management team has intervened directly in the field, in partnership, to improve financial management. In Ségou, the cercle's local orientation committee, after discussions with the regional PGP team, proposed to reinforce financial management in the cercle's 29 communes. PGP worked hand-in-hand with the PACT project²⁰ to introduce accounting tools that complied with the law. In most of the communes, expenses had been noted on plain paper. Practical exercises were held in 11 of PGP's 15 zones to walk communal officials and agents through the use of the aforementioned accounting tools. PACT and PGP, in partnership with the Communal Advising Centers (CCC) and the Treasury, decided to replicate the practical training throughout their respective project areas. This process has already begun in the PACT and PGP communes in the regions of Timbuktu, Ségou, and Koulikoro. This process has necessitated the capacity strengthening of Treasury and MATCL officials to play a greater role in the accompaniment of the communes. Accordingly, PGP and PACT have established national-level relations with MATCL and the Ministry of Finance through the *Direction Nationale des Collectivités Territoriales* (DNCT) and the *Direction du Trésor*. The first concrete result was a joint exercise in July-August with the DNCT's financial division to develop the capacity of MATCL and Treasury officials in Ségou.

Results from the field indicate that PGP provided training and support to 122 communes in financial management. There are 35 reported cases in which PGP was also able to carry out close mentoring of commune officials and staff in the use of proper forms and procedures, as well as in compliance with legal deadlines for filing with the MATCL. A total of 59 communes have been able to confirm that forms introduced are in fact being used.

In 8 notable cases, support was also provided in acquisitions. In one zone in Sikasso, 3 acquisitions out of 3 that occurred in the zone during this period complied with legal procedures thanks to PGP involvement. In Loulouni²¹, the first deputy mayor refused to sign when the mayor did not comply with legal

¹⁸ Bankass cercle, Mopti region

¹⁹ Sikasso cercle and region

²⁰ PACT is a governance project run by the German GTZ agency

²¹ Kadiolo cercle, Sikasso region

procedures. Although there are few reported cases regarding improved acquisition procedures, PGP considers these cases encouraging and important. A climate of transparency and good management practice in communities cannot be achieved in a compartmentalized fashion. Legal procedures in acquisitions will continue to be encouraged and tracked.

1.4.2 Quantitative results for indicator

Indicator Number	Indicator	USAID baseline	PGP baseline	(USAID) target FY 05	Overall Results FY 05	Yr 1 Comm.	Yr 2 Comm.
IR 1.2	% of Communes that Follow Legal Procedures in Executing Annual Budget	14%	14%	25%	20,00%	23,29%	18,64%

1.4.3 Analysis

Results for FY2005 indicate that 20% of target communes comply with legal procedures in executing their annual budget. This includes accounting practice that separates decision-making from accounting, and quarterly reports to MATCL and to the public. The result, a 70% increase over the baseline value for 2004, falls 5 points short of the USAID performance target for FY2005. If one considers that the bulk of activity was conducted in first year communes (73 out of 100 communes), the difference between the USAID target and project performance moves closer to 1.71 points (25 - 23.29).

The 23.29 value for first year communes is consistent with activity reports from the field on use of official accounting formats. According to field reports, 59 communes are systematically using legal accounting tools (23.6%). The equivalence between that value (23.6%) taken from field activities and the percentage of first year communes that comply with legal procedures (23.29%) suggests there may be a correlation between complying with legal formats and complying with other legal obligations. Greater analysis is required to confirm or refute the correlation.

1.5 CONFLICT PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT

This heading includes activities corresponding to indicator IR 1.5.

Conflict is a given. It is a natural part of human exchange and competition. In Mali, increasing pressure over land use and resources increases competition and desperation, leading to increases in the number of conflicts. As transit corridors are squeezed by expanding agriculture, the number of incidents rises. The great majority of communes have traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution at the village level. When the conflict cannot be solved, commune officials are usually asked to intervene. Commune officials are solicited more often than state officials and magistrates.

Conflicts also grow out of the local management of collective services. Conflict is a natural by-product when constituents group together in formal modern structures to manage common resources. In this

TWO BIRDS, ONE STONE

Niamana* was a commune paralyzed. A major conflict over natural resource management kept a financial and technical development partner at bay and a forest mismanaged. A second conflict between two parties vying for the vacant seat of village chief kept a community deadlocked. The first conflict was resolved through a commune-driven process assisted by PGP. A partnership agreement was signed and work is underway to apply community-based solutions to the management of the forest. The second conflict was subsequently resolved when one of the parties, a traditional leader, changed his outlook and decided to reach out, relinquishing his claim to power. That leader was reportedly closely involved in the resolution of the first conflict.

* San cercle, Segou Regou

particular case, conflict needs to be considered with a larger set of organizational dysfunctions that require intervention. Resolving these dysfunctions within organized groups will require conflict management and facilitation skills at the commune level. It is to be expected that, as communes begin to exert oversight functions over previously unchecked or corrupted groups, these skills will become increasingly valuable.

1.5.1 Activities and achievements

Over the last 12 months PGP has provided advice and support in conflict prevention and management to 67 communes out of the 73 first year communes with which PGP had adopted Strategic Partnership Plans. Support was provided in inventory and analysis of existing conflicts, in establishing conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms and in commune interventions in ongoing conflicts. Commune officials addressed a total of 39 conflicts with PGP support.

Out of the 39, 29 were resolved entirely, 6 partially and 4 are ongoing. Conflict in PGP communes springs from various sources. Thirteen conflicts were related to NRM and land tenure; 6 were internal to the commune; 4 involved relations with state officials; 7 involved commune-village relations and included villages that do not recognize the commune to which they have been administratively assigned. Three were internal to village councils, including one case of embezzlement; 2 concerned embezzlement in service associations; 4 concerned the management of markets and other public infrastructure and equipment. In 33 of the 67 communes, PGP support led to the establishment of conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms, in the form of committees at the commune level.

THE COMMUNE PICKS UP WHERE JUSTICE STOPS

With counsel from PGP, the Mayor of Bougoula* intervened just in time to avoid probable bloodshed between Kane villagers and Peul pastoralists. Made aware of a sudden decision to set free 2 Peuls accused of assault on a Kane boy in retaliation for a skirmish between Peul and Kane families, commune officials cooled down Kane tempers and helped pastoralists find a solution. The Peul family agreed to move to a nearby village, preserving peace and avoiding possibly tragic consequences in Falan village. The conflict had erupted over vagrant livestock grazing on cultivated land. The Peul had refused to pay the village fine of 1,000 CFA per head for such infringements, per local regulations governing land use, and a physical fight had ensued. Conflicts between herders and farmers are becoming more frequent as cultivated areas spread and squeeze traditional grazing areas and transit routes.

* Kati cercle, Koulikoro Region

1.5.2 Quantitative results

Indicator Number	Indicator	USAID baseline	PGP Baseline	(USAID) target FY 05	Overall Results FY 05	Yr 1 Communes	Yr 2 Communes
IR 1.5	% of Communes with Participatory CM Mechanisms	43%	64%	48%	75,60%	77,78%	75,14%

1.5.3 Analysis

PGP's FY2005 survey of 250 target communes indicates that 75.6% of communes have participatory conflict resolution mechanisms in place. The indicator measures the presence of modern and traditional mechanisms. This is an increase of 11.6 points in one year over PGP's internal baseline of 64%. The value is 27.6 points above the USAID target for FY2005 (48%).

The value for first year communes, where the bulk of conflict-related activities took place, is at 77.78%, only 2.64 points above new communes (75.14%). This phenomenon is explained by the fact that PGP conducted a diagnostic of almost every one of the 250 target communes. The diagnostic often revealed conflict and traditional conflict management mechanisms to newly-elected officials who may not have been aware of them. The result is visible in quantitative data. A greater number of communes are aware of traditional mechanisms than they were one year ago. This explains part of the increase and the similarity between first year and new communes.

According to activity reports, formal, modern mechanisms were introduced in 33 communes out of 250, or 13.3%. The impact of PGP on conflict management needs to be appraised not only in terms of mechanisms, but also in terms of experience. Commune officials experienced hands-on conflict management in 39 instances, and succeeded in 29 of those cases. This experience is extremely valuable. Practice precedes form, and the practice of conflict management will naturally precede the emergence of formal mechanisms.

2: OBJECTIVE 2: MACRO-POLITICAL ENABLING ENVIRONMENT STRENGTHENED

2.1 ACTIVITIES AND ACHIEVEMENTS

The PGP team continued its efforts to contribute to the strengthening of the macro-political environment supporting the decentralization and local governance processes. These continuing efforts were directed at three institutions, two government agencies, and two civil society organizations and focused on the key issue of the transfer of responsibilities and resources from the central government to the communes:

1. supporting the initiative of the *Direction Nationale Des Collectivités Territoriales* to accelerate the transfer of responsibilities and resources;
2. building the capacity of the *Haut Conseil des Collectivités* to determine, to prioritize, and to defend the interests of the decentralized entities that it represents;
3. working with the Administration and Decentralization Committee of the National Assembly to conduct activities and/or to pass legislation that will pressure the executive branch to accelerate the decentralization process; and
4. building collaboration and partnership with key civil society organizations that can provide support on the ground and advocate for a more favorable macro-political environment to the decentralisation process.

Collaboration with the Direction Nationale des Collectivités Territoriales (DNCT)

The DNCT of the *Ministère de l'Administration Territoriale et des Collectivités Locales* (MATCL) has been the lead GRM agency in the design, implementation, and monitoring of the decentralization reforms and its principal collaborator on all interventions (like the PGP) designed to support and strengthen the decentralization and local governance process in Mali. It is viewed as a credible and committed agency by most technical and financial partners. At a national workshop that it organized in October, 2004, the DNCT developed an Operational Plan for the Transfer of Responsibilities and Resources (through 2005) in collaboration with most partner institutions and GRM agencies, thereby gaining the adherence of these stake-holders. This document serves as the reference for PGP actions in this realm. Since it was clearly preferable to work within the framework of the national plan, the PGP staff actively participated in the workshop proceedings and will help push for its timely implementation and will seek to influence the follow-on actions when the time comes.

Assistance to the Haut Conseil des Collectivités (HCC)

The PGP continued throughout the year to provide assistance for strengthening the capacity of the HCC to play its constitutional role and to push for major reforms in decentralization.

As discussed in the last two quarterly reports, the HCC finalized the draft report prepared by the PGP and GTZ consulting team of Mr. Ousmane Sy/CEPIA and Dr. Sheldon Gellar (their participation was funded by PGP) and Mr. Diakalia Dembelé from PACT/GTZ. The consultants' findings and recommendations

were approved by the HCC. The next step consisted of organizing to gain support for the implementation of the recommendations and developing synergies with the various technical and financial partners of the HCC around that program. With the help of the CEPIA firm, the HCC drafted an operational plan that was reviewed internally and adopted. The HCC then called a meeting of its partners, where it presented the plan and obtained some verbal commitments for support in the implementation of the plan.

Collaboration with the National Assembly (AN)

The PGP has maintained continuous contact and a productive relationship with the AN's Administration and Decentralization Committee, whose members have very interesting ideas and a plan to push for the accelerated transfer of responsibilities and resources. The PGP decided to accompany the Committee in the implementation of its plan. Two very important activities were conducted collaboratively.

The first consisted of advocating for support with the rest of the AN members, reaching out to the other institutions like the HCC and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (CESC) to build a joint pressure group.

To implement this plan, the Committee organized, with the assistance of PGP and other AN partner, a 2-day meeting for all of the members of parliament. The purpose of the meeting was to inform MPs about the status of the decentralization process and the results achieved to date and to have them reflect on potential measures and legislation to support the work of the committee. By the end of the meeting the MPs declared they were ready to support the committee in its efforts to pressure the executive to accelerate the decentralization process.

The Committee then organized a joint meeting of the AN, the HCC and the CESC, again with support from the PGP and other AN partners. The purpose of this meeting was to review the status of the decentralization process, to create a regular forum for consultation (a tripartite committee) among the three institutions, and to make recommendations for strengthening decentralization. It was agreed at the meeting that this tripartite committee would serve as a watchdog, monitoring the implementation of action plans and recommendations made at various fora for the strengthening of the macro-political environment on decentralisation.

Mobilizing civil society organizations

Working with and supporting civil society organizations is one of the major axes of the PGP approach. The PGP team conducted a series of meetings with CSOs in order to solicit their support in advocating for participation and the transfer of responsibilities. PGP received many commitments for support in grassroots work, but very few in advocacy activities.

2.2 QUANTITATIVE RESULTS

Shortly after the completion of FY05, a PGP team collected data on national-level advocacy activities by interviewing representatives of six institutions and organizations involved in the crucial issue of the transfer of responsibilities and resources. The table below presents the results. The advocacy activities conducted by the HCC, the DNCT, the CDI, the ACCRM, the AMM and the CESC have significantly increased in relation to the baseline and the target.

Indicator Number	Indicator	USAID Baseline	FY05 Target	FY05 Results
IR 2.1	Number of national level advocacy activities on the transfer of responsibilities to communes	19	25	36

Indicator Number	Indicator	USAID Baseline	FY05 Target	FY05 Results
IR 2.2	Number of national level advocacy activities on the transfer of state revenues to communes	19	25	34

2.3 ANALYSIS

Three main observations could be made following the interviews. The first relates to the exercise of the constitutional power conferred on a given institution, a question raised by PGP during the interviews. All of the leaders of the target institutions reiterated that they have adopted a quiet, non-confrontational approach in their relations with other institutions. They do not want to invoke and use their constitutional power against the executive branch and take the risk of provoking an institutional crisis in the country. The second observation relates to the existence of an advocacy program. It is clear from the data collected that no institution has developed anything close to an advocacy campaign (a program with a defined strategy). At present, they are only conducting discrete activities, mostly in an ad hoc manner. These institutions appear more preoccupied by the material conditions in which they work than by the planning and implementation of coordinated programs that would help them carry out their missions. The third observation relates to the status of the AMM and the ACCRM, which is different from that of the other four institutions. The AMM and ACCRM are civil society organizations that are a bit more inclined to confront the executive branch and ready for a full-fledged advocacy campaign if they get the assistance needed.

- Surprisingly, the data shows that the quiet, non-confrontational, ad hoc approach has yielded some very significant results over the last 12 months, including:
- The MATCL/DNCT was successful in putting in place the inter-ministerial committee on the transfer of responsibilities and resources and in holding the first meeting. The MATCL/DNCT is also in the process of getting each ministry (that has not already done so) to create a decentralization unit (cellule de decentralisation). These organs will maintain a continuous dialogue with the MATCL on all issues related to advancing the decentralization agenda in all sectors of government activities.
- The HCC was able to obtain the lifting of the suspension of the communes' control over the sale of public land in the six urban communes of Bamako. They are pressing for the suspension to be lifted for rural communes, too.
- The HCC was able to convince the MATCL to draft a law on the status of the local elected officials who now have no legal protection under existing laws.
- The HCC was able to press for a review of the legal code on decentralization (Code des Collectivités) and amend some parts of it that are conducive to better management of communal affairs, such as the famous contracting authority (maîtrise d'ouvrage).
- During their regional meetings with their constituencies, HCC officials were able to persuade the Governor of Koulikoro to change his way of handling the issue of school management in his region, especially in the hiring of teachers and building of schools.
- The HCC President recently met with the Prime Minister to deplore what he considered to be the catastrophic status of the decentralized entities. The Prime Minister has been responsive to his plea and is planning to convene a meeting of the stakeholders to discuss the issues related to the transfer of resources.

PGP's Component III Management Team has been successful with its approach to synergy- building, which consisted of putting the leaders of the national institutions in the driver's seat, of having them take charge of creating synergies among its technical and financial partners. This has led PGP to undertake

joint activities with PAGRAN, a U.N.D.P.-funded project, and the Conrad Adenauer Foundation under the aegis of the AN and the HCC. Most of these activities were planned, implemented, and reviewed together with the host institution, with each of the partners contributing the resources available under its program.

The outlook for Component III is very promising for three reasons. First, the internal mechanisms to advance the decentralization agenda are in place within the executive branch of government. The inter-ministerial commission is installed and working and the decentralization units (*cellules*) at the technical ministries are being put in place and will start working shortly. The second reason is that the passive stance of these institutions has been shaken. The HCC, the CESC and the AN have entered into an alliance, instituting a forum for periodically reviewing the status of the decentralization process in order to act as a pressure group and a watchdog. The third factor is the willingness of the two major CSOs created by local leaders to forcefully advocate for the decentralization agenda, provided they receive assistance in doing so. The conjunction of the work of the DNCT, advocating for from within the government, the non-confrontational approach of the forum (*cadre de concertation*) put in place by three of the seven institutions, and the readiness of AMM and ACCRM to engage in advocacy should result in a dynamic that will speed up the achievement of substantive results over the coming year.

C. PUBLIC-PRIVATE ALLIANCES (PPA)/COST SHARE

MSI and its two on-the-ground sub-contractors, Save the Children and CARE, all track their contributions to PPA and cost sharing, using their own management information systems.

TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS

The total amount of the PPA and cost share contributions of the MSI consortium through September 30, 2005 is approximately \$542,315.²² This figure easily surpasses MSI's contractual target of 3.5% of the obligated amount, which at September 30, 2005, would have required PGP to capture PPA/Cost Share amounting to \$260,750.

Public-Private Alliance and Cost Share contributions have been captured from a variety of sources, ranging from large, international donors to smaller-scale, local NGO partners, to American universities. This has added to the project's success to date. Partnerships have taken on various forms, including: technical assistance provided by the Malian government and other international donors, in-kind contributions from local NGOs, and the innovative concept of distance-learning programs, taught via the internet by Syracuse University. The partnerships have contributed to the activities envisioned in the annual work plans as well as expanded the project beyond originally anticipated boundaries. As a result of PPA-Cost Share, PGP has been encouraged to work in areas closely related but not directly tied to decentralization. Local implementers and stakeholders are not only participants in PGP activities, but by contributing to the project, they strengthen their ownership in PGP and how their resources are to be utilized to best serve their communities.

²² This is a provisional figure, pending finalization of the full contributions of several PGP's partners, including the Government of Mali and GTZ. MSI will submit a detailed report on PPA/cost share to USAID, under separate cover, by the end of the calendar year.

PPA-Cost Share has also provided an opportunity for PGP to expand beyond the democracy and governance sector, in the narrow sense of the term, to incorporate activities in other sectors such as health, education, and water. And, through PPA-Cost Share, the PGP has been able to devote additional resources to geographic areas where the same was needed. For instance, Save the Children contributed a vehicle for use in the Gao and Kidal regions because the project did not have funds to procure another vehicle and it was clear that field agents in Gao and Kidal could more safely and effectively carry out their responsibilities if they used transportation other than the motorcycles used by PGP field agents elsewhere. As a result of this contribution, PGP's productivity in Gao and Kidal regions has increased.

PGP's relationships with local partners and other NGOs, the Malian government, and other international donors have proved critical to the project's success in the area of PPA/Cost Share and have been the reason that the project has achieved more than half a million dollars in PPA-Cost Share to date. The breakdown of funds can be seen in the chart below.²³

Source of contribution	Amount of contribution (in USD) ²⁴
NGO partners in Koulikoro, Sikasso, Gao, and Kidal zones	\$34,254
Local partners (communes & communities) in those zones	\$68,016
Save the Children	\$270,030
Syracuse University: distance-learning course for NGO capacity-building	\$20,200
GTZ: TA on institutional assessment of the HCC	\$13,200
MSI	\$5,907
NGO partner in the District of Bamako	\$4,505
Bamako communes and the MATCL	\$6,806
SNV	\$42,343
National Assembly: exchange visit to Senegal	\$3,248
SUBTOTAL	\$468,509
Contribution line item	Amount of contribution (in USD)
Personnel Costs	\$4,239
Professional Services	\$54,413
Equipment Expenses	\$2,398
Materials and Consumables	\$1,075
Travel and Transportation	\$1,032
Occupancy	\$9,141
Miscellaneous	\$1,508
SUBTOTAL	\$73,806
TOTAL	\$542,315

²³ The headings "Source of contribution" and "Contribution line item" reflect the different established ways in which PGP consortium partners record PPA-Cost Share contributions.

²⁴ Exchange rate: \$1 = 525

OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS NOT INCLUDED IN THE \$542,315 FIGURE

In furtherance of PGP's Objective 2 (Component 3), MSI has succeeded in leveraging contributions from several key donors (GTZ, UNDP, and the Conrad Adenauer Foundation), from a local firm active in decentralization (CEPIA), and from the National Assembly. The data concerning these contributions is not available as of this writing, but will be presented in the next PGP report. Through its NGO partner in the District of Bamako, MSI has also managed to leverage a significant contribution from SNV, which has a decentralization activity focused on Bamako, in furtherance of the PGP's Objective/Component 1.

Another of PGP's main sub-contractors, Koni Expertise, also has played an important role in PGP's achievement of its PPA/cost share targets (and its efforts to achieve synergies). PGP's Local Governance Financial Management Specialist, who is provided by Koni Expertise and who heads Component 2 of the project, has forged a very productive partnership with GTZ for the installation of commune accounting systems in the cercles of Ségou, Baraouéli, and Kati. The level of GTZ's contribution to this joint program will be presented in a subsequent PGP report, along with the figures mentioned directly above.

D. MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)

The PGP designed its M&E system, which was approved by USAID in FY04, both to contribute to the Mission's SO8 Results Framework, per the Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP), and to inform the PGP Management Team's programmatic decision-making. In accordance with its M&E plan, the PGP conducted its annual quantitative and qualitative data collection in September, 2005. The table on the following page presents PGP's FY05 results for each SO8 indicator, broken down by Year 1 and 2 communes, and baseline figures and FY05 targets so as to facilitate the reader's analysis of the data. An in-depth analysis of the data on each indicator can be found in the relevant sections of this report.

It should be noted that the PGP encountered some difficulties in the course of its data analysis for SO3, IR 1.2 and IR 1.6, which varied according to the nature of the indicators. In the case of SO3, as was noted earlier, the basic problem was the tabulation of partnerships on the PGP baseline that should probably not have been counted. The questionnaire and manual for the data collection agents must be revised to address this issue and the field agents trained in the new procedures. It is hardly surprising that PGP has encountered difficulties in collecting data for the two indicators on communal financial management. IR 1.2 uses an indirect approach (since one cannot simply ask communal authorities if they comply with legal procedures and record the "yes" response that is sure to follow): field agents analyze the communal authorities' detailed explanation about their financial management procedures and determine whether the commune has in fact fulfilled the criteria. Up to now, this analysis has been too lenient. Either the field agents must receive further instruction and training on this point, or the analysis must be made by other PGP staff, which would be incompatible with the PGP approach. In verifying IR 1.6 results, PGP/Bamako staff discovered that some data was incompatible with that collected in FY04. PGP has instructed the regional teams to collect further data in order to determine the nature of the problem, but has not received the definitive results from this follow-up exercise.

Parenthetically, PGP proposes to move up the period of its annual data collection in FY06 to July or August so as to allow more time for verification and, if needed, correction of the data.

It is important to note that PGP will provide feedback in the coming weeks to the various stakeholders at the national, regional, and local levels on the results of the data collected.

METHODOLOGY FOR QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE DATA COLLECTION

The quantitative data was collected by PGP field agents in all 250 target communes, using the Local Governance Questionnaire and another tool, entitled the “*Fiche de Renseignements de Base sur la Commune*”. These tools were revised prior to the exercise to incorporate the new USAID indicators and the lessons learned from the annual data collection of a year ago.

The PGP decided to adopt a new and innovative methodology for this year’s qualitative data collection, one that was consistent with its value of maximizing internal human resources and with the methodology used for the evaluations of the NGO partnerships in February, 2005. Each regional (and district) team developed its own set of tools for the data collection process, in accordance with the guidelines established by PGP/Bamako’s senior management team. The exercise, conducted in some 30 Year 1 communes, or about 12% of the PGP’s target communes, succeeded not only in providing an in-depth examination at the quality of the program, but also in orienting the PGP’s FY06 Annual Plan, which was developed using the project’s standard bottom-up approach.

NEW AND MODIFIED SO8 INDICATORS

The Mission’s SO8 Results Framework was modified during the latter stages of FY05 in order to measure the PGP’s specific contributions to other SO Teams, thereby incorporating the close linkages between DG and these sectors. This led to the addition of three indicators (and one sub-indicator) and to the modification of two others, after DG’s consultation with the Education, Health, and Accelerated Economic Growth (AEG) SO Teams. The changes to the SO8 Results Framework can be summarized as follows:

- the disaggregation of data by sector (education, health, water, NRM, and economic) on existing indicators (SO3, IR 1.3 and 1.4) relating to commune-level partnerships;
- new indicator IR 1.7 (and sub-indicator 1.7.1) on the participation of CSOs and COs, by sector, in the Commune Development Plan and the commune’s annual budget; and
- new indicators SO4 and IR 1.8 on NRM and biodiversity.

DATA QUALITY ASSESSMENT

In July, 2005, the DG Team conducted a Data Quality Assessment to verify the quality of the performance data provided by the PGP to the Mission and to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the data collection system. The assessment was favorable -- PGP’s data collection system was deemed to meet USAID’s quality control standards -- and the DG Team pointed out strengths and areas for improvement.

GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEM

In its effort to contribute to, and benefit from, the Mission’s Geographic Information System (GIS), the PGP purchased Geographic Positioning System (GPS) units in FY05 for each of its NGO partners. PGP received assistance from the Mission’s GIS Specialist not only in the selection of the GPS units, but also in training the PGP staff in their use. After the training, PGP field staff began recording governance-

related coordinates throughout the project zone, data which is available for producing maps. The ongoing recording of these coordinates will continue in the coming year and will be extend to reflect the participation in local governance of CSOs/COs from technical sectors to reflect synergies with the Mission's other SO Teams.

Indicator #	Indicator	USAID base-line	PGP base-line	USAID target FY 05	Overall Results FY 05	Results in Year 1 Communes	Results in Year 2 Communes
SO3	% of communes with partnerships that increase services	30%	61%	36%	52%	56%	50%
	- Education *	n/a			25%	n/a	
	- Health *	n/a			21%	n/a	
	- Water *	n/a			19%	n/a	
	- NRM *	n/a			16%	n/a	
	- Economy *	n/a			24%	n/a	
SO4	NRM taken into account in Commune Development Plan (CDP) *	n/a			74%	81%	72%
IR 1.1	% of communes where annual budgets reflect CDP priorities	63%	56%	63%	66%	67%	66%
IR 1.1.1	% of communes whose communities participate in the preparation of the CDP	n/a	53%	n/a	77%	86%	74%
IR 1.1.2	% of communes whose communities participate in the preparation of the communal budget	n/a	27%	n/a	20%	25%	18%
IR 1.2	% of communes that follow legal procedures in executing annual budget	14%	14%	25%	20%	23%	19%
IR 1.3	% of communes that have addressed development needs through joint action	53%	40%	55%	40%	42%	38%
	- Education *	n/a			18%	n/a	
	- Health *	n/a			10%	n/a	
	- Water *	n/a			15%	n/a	
	- NRM *	n/a			9%	n/a	
	- Economy *	n/a			11%	n/a	
IR 1.4	% communes leveraged resources From private sector for public goods/services	6%	7%	7%	1%	1%	1%
IR 1.5	% of communes with participatory conflict management mechanisms	43%	64%	48%	76%	78%	75%
IR 1.6	% of communes where tax collection rate increases yearly	64%	44%	64%	47%	45%	48%

Indicator #	Indicator	USAID base-line	PGP base-line	USAID target FY 05	Overall Results FY 05	Results in Year 1 Communes	Results in Year 2 Communes
IR 1.7	% of communes that consulted Civil Society/Community Organizations during CDP process *	n/a			86%	88%	85%
	- Education *	n/a			67%	n/a	
	- Health *	n/a			64%	n/a	
	- Water *	n/a			20%	n/a	
	- NRM *	n/a			27%	n/a	
	- Economy *	n/a			57%	n/a	
IR 1.7.1	% of communes that consulted CSOs/COs during annual budget planning *	n/a			64%	66%	63%
	- Education *	n/a			44%	n/a	
	- Health *	n/a			42%	n/a	
	- Water *	n/a			11%	n/a	
	- NRM *	n/a			16%	n/a	
	- Economy *	n/a			35%	n/a	
IR 1.8	Number of written NRM agreements *	n/a			28	9	19
IR 2.1	Number of national-level advocacy activities on the transfer of responsibilities to communes	19		25	36	N/A	N/A
IR 2.2	Number of national-level advocacy activities on the transfer of state revenues to communes	19		25	34	N/A	N/A
IR 3.1	% of communes where women are represented on the management bodies of basic social services **	25%		27%	5%	6%	5%
IR 3.2	% of communes where activities target women's needs	32%	36%	45%	59%	65%	57%

* = new indicator; thus, no baseline data or FY05 target

** = FY05 result is based on data from the 243 communes that reported on this indicator

CONCLUSIONS

Beyond building the foundation.

The Shared Governance Program, or PGP, has been able to build on the solid foundation laid during the first year of implementation, whose main pillar was a very capable team that could function independently in conducting PGP's innovative work with commune-level actors. By the beginning of

FY05, the team had facilitated the negotiation of partnership agreements signed by the commune and the NGO partner, conducted participatory commune diagnostics, and developed governance improvement plans (referred to in French as “PSP”) in the 73 Year 1 communes, and had designed the major tools that were needed for full implementation.

Now, a year later, the program is fully operational (active in all 250 target communes) and implementation is proceeding smoothly. The PGP has signed a partnership agreement and conducted the Participatory Diagnostic in the remaining 177 target communes and facilitated a PSP in all but a handful of those communes. Critical difficulties and challenges have been identified and are kept under manageable control. Some are being addressed, while others will be tackled soon.

By the end of the second year, not only has “shared governance” become a household term throughout the country, but the PGP team has also established itself as a major and credible actor in the world of the facilitators of Mali’s decentralization process. It has participated in and contributed substantive input to all fora organized in the sector at various levels and has advocated for the shared governance approach. The PGP has helped erect in its target communes the frame and the walls upon the foundations that were laid in the first year.

The PGP team took advantage of the opportunity offered by the timing of the preparation of the new Commune Development Plans (referred to in French as “*PDSeC*”) to provide assistance to 174 of the 250 communes in the preparation of the five-year plan. They also assisted in the preparation of the communes’ 2005 annual budget, a process that was marked by a sizable increase in the participation of various actors.

In FY05 the PGP also conducted a study on the typology of conflicts and provided counsel and support to 67 of the 73 Year 1 communes in the management of some acute conflicts. In some cases, such as Niamana commune in the Cercle of San, the resolution of the conflict resulted in the flow of more development resources to the communes.

PGP’s financial management improvement team combined efforts with PACT/GTZ to begin the process of training commune actors in assessing established financial management procedures and identifying existing compliance problems and assisting in the creation of transparent financial management systems. Agents in 18 communes have participated in this self-diagnostic exercise and received this on-the-job training. This innovative approach received recognition from the Prefect of San, who requested that the training be conducted for all the communes in the Cercle.

Through its assistance to communes in developing strategies for diversifying the tax base and improving tax collection and resource mobilization, PGP was able to help maintain the tax collection rate in most first year communes in a year of widespread drought and acute economic crisis.

Finally, the PGP has refined its M&E tools and its quantitative data processing in order to enhance its capacity to report on and analyze the SO8 performance indicators. Thanks to these modifications, the PGP will also be able to provide timely feedback on the FY05 data results to stakeholders at the commune, regional, and national levels, thereby improving PGP’s relationship with these partners and furthering a discussion on related issues.

DIFFICULTIES

Year 2 implementation of the Shared Governance Program was marked by some major accomplishments, and the discovery of numerous challenges and opportunities, which are described below.

BUILDING OWNERSHIP FOR SUSTAINABLE SYSTEMS

The PGP is a catalyst that operates on the assumption that it is contributing to the work of the MATCL and other actors that they are tasked to do by law. It relies heavily on support from and the involvement of all the actors at all levels to ensure that activities promoting the consolidation of the decentralization and local governance process are carried out properly. However, the PGP implementing partners and field agents have encountered difficulties in obtaining the support and sense of ownership that are needed, which are essential to PGP's success. To develop this ownership, the agents have often conducted an intense campaign on ownership, facilitated the creation of local mechanisms, such as steering and monitoring committees (comités de pilotage and comités de suivi), in each commune and trained the members in the discharge of their duties. However, most of these committees do not work because their members continue to insist on receiving per diem payments for their services. The PGP works with the MATCL/DNCT at the central level and with its representatives in the field who exercise control on the decentralized entities. The tutelle and the technical services are required by law to provide assistance, advice and to regularly control the communes' compliance with Malian laws and regulations. This is not always forthcoming. At the macro-level, the same problem exists with respect to the development of relationships with institutions and CSOs in charge of defending the interests of the decentralized entities. They, too, stick to the established practice of considering those relationships as ones based on the provision of resources to enable them to carry out their responsibilities. Fighting those expectations slows down the work of mobilizing the actors to own the program and those organizations to own the advocacy work on the transfer of responsibilities and resources. The first major challenge facing the PGP team is to devise a strategy and incentives for obtaining the support for its activities by local actors on the basis of real political interest instead of on the basis of payments received. The challenge is to make strategic choices that will yield immediate results and that will keep the outside support and work needed to build governance systems that will be valued and sustained after the program ends.

THE CIVIL SOCIETY ASSUMPTION

The second major challenge facing the PGP team is the institutional one. The project design assumed that Commune Councillors and civil society organization leaders had received the training they needed under past programs and that these leaders and their institutions had become strong enough to be able to enter into meaningful interactions with other structures as part of the shared governance approach. Unfortunately, this assumption does not hold in the present context of the communes (if it ever did). First, most of the Commune Councillors are new on the job following the high turn-over in the 2004 elections. Secondly, the outgoing councillors did very little to facilitate the work of their successors, who were not sufficiently briefed about ongoing issues and who often found key documents missing. The new capacity-building plans do not take advantage of the experience of former officials. Very few communes have functioning committees whose members are well versed in development sector issues like health and education. Thirdly, the CSOs are plagued by numerous internal weaknesses. Generally, CSOs are closed to scrutiny and lack legitimacy, having very little support from their membership. Accordingly, it is understandable that both elected officials and CSO leaders are likely to avoid interactions in order to hide these weaknesses. To make its approach work, the PGP must take that reality into account and work to strengthen both CSOs and Commune Councils internally, all the while promoting increased interactions.

ECONOMIC HARDSHIP

The decentralization reform in Mali was a purely political process that imposed the right of citizens to govern themselves in total disregard for the economic dimension of exercising that right in a country where one third of the people live under the poverty threshold. The weak economic situation in the communes is a critical factor that renders most communes barely viable. The difficult economic

condition of most communes is exacerbated by the 2004 locus attack and ensuing drought and the continuing political crisis in the neighboring Ivory Coast. These factors combine to hinder the capacity of Malians to participate in shared governance and to provide resources to support the functioning of local government in many places. The effects of these adverse economic conditions will linger for the foreseeable future and will reduce the capacity of the Malian people and their leaders to participate in any externally driven governance improvement activities.

GOVERNANCE IN THE AREA OF THE OFFICE DU NIGER

The *Office du Niger* (ON) has an agricultural and industrial dimension that makes it an extremely important company for the economy of the country. USAID implements programs in its area and the MCA is preparing to launch a program there. The communes in this zone have a special status and relationship with the ON. The residents of the area suffer from the complete disregard for their basic governance rights, a situation which complicates relationships for our partners. At every step of the PGP's implementation, the Ségou regional team is confronted with major problems between the partner communes and the *Office du Niger* in which it is asked to intervene. The PGP has to be responsive to the requests of the partner communes and it therefore finds itself brought into the handling of the strained relationship between the two parties.

OVERVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION IN FY06

In light of the results achieved in the past two years, the PGP staff is ready to consolidate the gains made and proceed with full implementation of the PGP approach in all 250 target communes, by providing innovative facilitation and accompaniment. Consolidation will entail the development of sustainable systems and processes of local governance that will be owned and operated by the commune actors themselves. The next level of consolidation activities of the shared governance approach will take into consideration all the important lessons learned during the first two years of program implementation and will be centered on the following:

- obtaining more synergy among actors and more ownership by the commune actors. At the central level, the PGP team will continue its efforts within USAID and extend those efforts to the major central programs. It will take the lead and conduct synergy-building activities with other major development programs such as CSLP, PASAOP, PACR in the same way as was done with the Haut Conseil de Lutte contre le SIDA. The purpose of these meetings will be to convince those programs to work with PGP, to take advantage of the PGP structure and its excellent relationship with the commune councils, and to develop programs under the ownership of the commune councils, as mandated by the constitution and subsequent laws.
- At the regional level, the first thing that the teams will do is to evaluate their own members' capabilities to provide a high level of accompaniment. They will then determine what reinforcement they need and review and fine-tune their accompaniment model under the guidance of the central team. Following that, the regional teams will evaluate the performance with the tools used during the previous year, increase their familiarity with the tools, make the necessary adjustments, update them, and use them to a higher level of sophistication.
- Ownership and sustainability will constitute the next level of focus of PGP actions. At the regional level, the program's full energies will be devoted to the implementation of the third phase of building the capacities of commune actors to manage the modest implementation

structures that were put in place to begin the process of ownership. The two levels will work together to build credibility and to get the tutelle and the technical services to assume ownership. All activities will be conducted under the full leadership of the CC and its executive committee (bureau).

- The emphasis will remain on financial management training and the diversification of financial resources, two pillars that will help in building the viability of communes. The financial management training will be extended to the remaining communes. This exercise will start in a number of cercles where the PGP is guaranteed support from the Prefect and will then be extended to the others once the program has demonstrated results that will cause others to jump on the bandwagon. The resource mobilization strategies will also be conducted. The NWP model will be operationalized and the communes will develop their NRM plans.
- Conflict management is an element of good governance and will be another priority of the third year program. In anticipation of the election of the National Councilors of the HCC and in recognition of the likelihood that the elections will breed conflicts, the regional teams and the NGO partners will devote considerable time and energy to the accompaniment of communes in the establishment of participatory conflict prevention and mitigation mechanisms in at least 3/5 of the PGP's target communes by the end of the third year of implementation.

SUMMARY OF PGP ACTIVITIES FROM FYO6 ANNUAL PLAN

FIRST SEMESTER ACTIVITIES

OBJECTIVE I (IRI): PARTICIPATION OF KEY COMMUNAL ACTORS IN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE INCREASED IN TARGETED COMMUNES

- To report to key actors on the results of FY05 program implementation. The commune council meetings, the Comités Régionaux d'Orientation (CRO), and the Comités Locaux d'Orientation (CLO) will be the fora used for those report presentations.
- To continue providing assistance in the process of preparing the commune development plans (PDSeC) and to ensure that the process is participative.
- To facilitate the smooth functioning of the commune committees so as to enable them to become responsive to constituents' requests and to interact with civil society organizations involved in their domains.
- To assist commune councils in the design of resource mobilization strategies at different levels and for different tax bases.
- To facilitate the promotion of women's participation in the life of the commune by the commune council.
- To promote the establishment of commune budgets that are related to the priorities set in the commune development plans, with the full participation of the public and their representative organizations in the process.
- PGP will continue accompaniment of the commune councils in the proper functioning of the communes and in the development of various governance functions using the tools developed by PGP.
- To work in perfect synergy with other USAID SO teams and build the capacities of the CGSs, the ASACOs, the producer organizations, and the NRM-related users' organizations internally and in their relations with commune councils.

- To conduct a study of the state of implementation of the recommendations made during the workshops on communication strategies.
- To conduct an evaluation of the state of implementation of the strategic communication plans developed by the communes and provide assistance as needed.
- To organize discussions on various topics related to PGP implementation so as to encourage the flow of information between the partners involved in the decentralization consolidation process.
- To conduct exchange visits inside Mali so that actors in the decentralization process can share their experiences.

OBJECTIVE 2 (IR 2): MACRO-POLITICAL ENABLING ENVIRONMENT STRENGTHENED.

- To collaborate with AMM and HCC to facilitate the establishment of the local government civil service.
- PGP will continue to support the HCC's efforts to build alliances with other actors for an advocacy program whose goal is operationalizing the transfer of responsibilities and resources.
- PGP will facilitate the replication of the above activities with other institutions and CSOs, including AMM and ACCRM.
- PGP will promote advocacy activities in financial management whose goal is to get the field-based services of the MATCL and the Ministry of Finances to take ownership of, and to supervise, the process of improving financial management in the communes.
- PGP will accompany communes in the search for partnerships with the private sector that will mobilize private funds for development needs.
- To prepare and submit to USAID the first semester's report.
- To conduct a study of the state of implementation of the recommendations made during the workshops on communication strategies.
- To conduct an evaluation of the state of implementation of the strategic communication plans developed by the communes and provide assistance as needed.
- To organize discussions on various topics related to PGP implementation so as to encourage the flow of information between the partners involved in the decentralization consolidation process.
- To conduct exchange visits inside Mali so that actors in the decentralization process can share their experiences.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES

- PGP will prepare and submit to USAID the first semester's report.
- PGP will organize a Project Advisory Committee (PAC) meeting every two months during the semester.
- PGP will organize the first semester's Project Advisory meeting on PGP implementation with the local NGO partners.

SECOND SEMESTER ACTIVITIES

OBJECTIVE I (IR 1)

- To facilitate meetings between elected and administrative officials in order to improve their working relationship.
- To assist in the organization of consultations, fora and public discussions on the preparation process of the 2006-2007 budget.

- PGP and PACT will negotiate a work plan with the MATCL and the Ministry of Finance that calls for the four parties to regularly monitor and to evaluate financial management in the communes -- specifically, the communes' use of the budget and accounting tools that have been made available to them and their compliance with legal procedures.
- To provide accompaniment to the communes in the establishment of participatory conflict management mechanisms.

OBJECTIVE 2 (IR 2) :

- To organize discussions on the topics of the transfer of the responsibilities and resources, on NWP, on resource mobilization, on conflict resolution, or on the findings of the aforementioned exchange visits.
- PGP will request the assistance of the Ministry which oversees small and medium enterprises to facilitate the development of relations between commune officials and Malian companies to create public/private partnerships.
- PGP will continue contacts with multinational companies operating in Mali. The team will take advantage of assistance offered by USAID's Regional Advisor for public private partnerships.
- To organize the awarding of small grants to performing communes in the areas of health, education, financial management, and NWP.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES

- To organize Project Advisory Committee meetings.
- To organize the Project Advisory meeting with the local NGO partners.
- To conduct qualitative and quantitative data collection, prepare and submit report.
- To prepare the FY06 Annual Report on program implementation.
- To prepare the next Annual Work Plan.

APPENDIX A: EXPLANATORY NOTE FOR THE MAP SECTION OF THE REPORT

This section of the Annual Report contains 15 maps, one for each PGP zone. The maps present data on a selected number of key IR-level indicators for each PGP commune in a given zone. The maps have been produced by the Mission's GIS Specialist, Mr. Rik Baeyens, and we hereby acknowledge his role and thank him (and the Mission) for his excellent and timely work.

- IR 1.1: % of communes where annual budgets reflect priorities in the Commune Development Plan
- IR 1.2: % of communes which follow legal procedures in executing their annual budget
- IR 1.3: % of communes that have addressed development needs through joint action
- IR 1.6: % of communes where tax collection rate increases annually
- IR 1.8: number of written Natural Resource Management agreements in target communes
- IR 3.2: % of communes where specific activities are implemented to meet women's needs

The legend of each map attributes a color to each of the above indicators, as follows:

- IR 1.1: If the color blue appears in the disc/pie of a particular commune, the annual budget in that commune reflects the priorities in its Commune Development Plan. If not, the annual budget in that commune does not reflect the priorities in its Commune Development Plan.
- IR 1.2: If the color yellow appears in the disc/pie of a particular commune, the commune follows legal procedures in executing its annual budget. If not, the commune does not.
- IR 1.3: If the color orange appears in the disc/pie of a particular commune, the commune has addressed a development need through joint action. If not, the commune did not.
- IR 1.6: If the color green appears in the disc/pie of a particular commune, the tax recovery rate in that commune increased from 2003 to 2004. If not, the rate did not increase.
- IR 1.8: If the color light pink appears in the disc/pie of a particular commune, that commune has a written NRM agreement. If not, the commune does not have a written NRM agreement.
- IR 3.2: If the color dark pink appears in the disc/pie of a particular commune, the communes had specific activities that were implemented to meet women's needs. If not, the commune did not.

The maps also present the following information:

- All PGP target communes are named and shaded a particular color, in accordance with the legend on each map (areas that do not fall within the PGP project zone are shaded grey);
- The name of the local NGO partner working in a given zone. (The NGO's acronym is used on the map; the full name can be found in the acronym section of this report.);
- The first year PGP communes (which are striped) and second year ones (which are not);
- The name of the region and the circles in that region in which the PGP target communes are located;
- The title of the map indicates the name of the PGP zone (from Zone A to Zone O).

PGP Intervention Zones A in the circles of Kati and Kangaba, Region of Koulikoro, Mali

Legend

- Zone A: AaDEC
- Year 1 Project Zones
- Region boundary
- Circle boundary


Indicators

- IR 1.1
- IR 1.2
- IR 1.3
- IR 1.6
- IR 1.8
- IR 3.2


Villages and Indicators:

- Ntjiba
- Kalifabougou
- Dio-gare
- Diago
- Kati
- Monibabougou
- Ngabacoro-droit
- Baguineda-camp
- Kalabancoro
- Sanankoroba
- Mountougoula
- N'gouraba
- Tiélé
- Bougoula
- Sanankoro-djoutoum
- Ouelessebougu
- Tiakadougou-dialakoro
- Nougou
- Selefougou
- Minidian
- Kariogo
- Karan
- Bancoumana
- Narena
- Siby
- Nioumamakana


PGP Intervention Zone B in the circles of Nara, Kolokani and Banamba,
Region of Koulikoro, Mali





PGP Intervention Zone C in the circles of Bougouni, Kolondieba and Yanfolila,
Region of Sikasso, Mali




PGP Intervention Zone D in the circles of Dioïla and Koulikoro,
Region of Koulikoro, Mali











PGP Intervention Zone G in the circles of Bla (Ségou region) and Koutiala (Sikasso region)
Mali























APPENDIX B: QUALITATIVE STUDY, SEGOU REGION 2005

I. Introduction

Conçue comme une activité complémentaire du système de suivi évaluation du PGP, l'étude qualitative vise fondamentalement à expliquer périodiquement les raisons du niveau de performance des communes cibles du programme. A cet effet, elle doit être un approfondissement des questions de fond qui se posent au niveau des communes par rapport aux thématiques objet de l'intervention du PGP.

Cette étude a été menée dans la zone couverte par la coordination régionale de Ségou sur la base d'une méthodologie ci-jointe en annexe avec un objectif global et trois objectifs spécifiques qui sont ainsi libellés :

Objectif Global : identifier les facteurs explicatifs du niveau de performance actuel des communes cibles du PGP dans la région de Ségou et le cercle de Koutiala.

Objectifs spécifiques :

- Analyser le niveau de performance des communes cibles du PGP selon les indicateurs du programme, sur la base des PSP et des résultats de l'enquête quantitative ;
- Recueillir les explications et suggestions éventuelles des acteurs de la commune sur ce niveau de performance de leurs communes respectives ;
- Systématiser les réponses en vue de dégager les tendances pour la région sur les facteurs explicatifs du niveau actuel de performance des communes cibles.

Elle a été conduite par des équipes incluant les différents niveaux de responsabilité de la CR de Ségou (CR, CGL, Superviseurs ONG et agents de terrain) avec comme cible un échantillon de 8 communes sélectionnées parmi les 21 communes pilotes²⁵. Il s'agit des communes de Niono, Diabaly, Farako, Cinzana, Bla, Zangasso, San et Tominian ; soit deux communes par zone.

Le présent rapport est une synthèse analytique des informations recueillies sur chaque indicateur.

²⁵ La Coordination régionale couvre au total 71 communes dont 21 pilotes.

QUALITATIVE STUDY, SEGOU REGION FY05

Indicateur 1.1 Pourcentage des communes où le budget annuel reflète les priorités fixées dans le Plan de Développement Communal

Questions	Réponses
1. Comment la commune a-t-elle déterminé les investissements prioritaires dans son budget de l'année 2005 ? Enumérez les étapes.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Recensement des besoins dans les villages lors des journées de consultation villageoise, - Rencontre avec les chefs de village pour vérifier si tous les besoins sont pris en compte - Planification pour la priorisation des besoins - Adoption en session et approbation par la tutelle - Les priorités ont été tirées du PDSEC. - A TOMINIAN, suite à l'épuisement de l'ancien plan, il y a eu une réunion du conseil communal avec l'appui du CCC pour décider des activités prioritaires dans un programme annuel conçu pour la circonstance. - A Cinzana, les informations sont recueillies par secteur de 20 villages par les conseillers et une confrontation a lieu en plénière pour faire la synthèse des priorités.
2. A quels groupes ces priorités ont-elle été communiquées avant adoption ? comment les femmes ont-elles été impliquées dans le processus ? Les priorités ont-elles rencontré une résistance ? Laquelle et pourquoi ?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Avant adoption, les priorités ont été communiquées aux conseils de villages et à la société civile (les OSC : APE, ASACO, jeunesse, femmes, et le secteur privé : les commerçants) - En plus des groupes cités les priorités ont été communiquées aux services techniques, aux partenaires au développement et aux confessions religieuses dans une commune (San) - Les femmes ont été impliquées à travers leurs associations telle que la CAFO depuis les consultations villageoises jusqu'au débat public. - A Tominian, seules les 3 femmes conseillères ont été impliquées. - Les priorités ont rencontré des résistances liées au fait que chaque village voulait que ses besoins soient pris comme priorités. Après explications basées sur le sens des priorités et le choix basé sur le taux de recouvrement des impôts et taxes des villages, les résistances se sont dissipées. - Les priorités n'ont pas connu de résistance (1 commune) - A Zangasso les priorités ont rencontré une résistance liée au choix entre l'hydraulique et l'éducation. On a procédé au vote pour départager. - A Cinzana, la commune est répartie en 5 secteurs et les priorités sont communiquées à toute la population à travers ces secteurs. Le choix des femmes est laissé à l'appréciation des villages

Questions	Réponses
3. Dans le processus d'élaboration du PDSEC de 2005 : comment ont été identifiées les priorités d'investissement des prochaines années ? Les priorités ont-elles rencontré une résistance ? Laquelle et pourquoi ? Quels plans sectoriels sont représentés dans le PDSEC ?	<p>- Les priorités ont été identifiées à partir des consultations villageoises et en fonction des urgences et de la capacité financière de la commune. Elles ont fait l'unanimité.</p> <p>- Les plans sectoriels représentés dans le PDSEC sont : Education, Santé, hydraulique, économie, l'habitat. En plus de ces secteurs, ceux du sport, de la culture et de l'environnement sont représentés dans le PDSEC d'une commune (San)</p>
4. Votre commune a-t-elle réalisé des actions qui ne sont pas prévues dans le plan de développement ? Si oui, Quelle démarche avez-vous suivi pour que des actions non prévues dans le plan soient budgétisées et réalisées ? Cette budgétisation non prévue dans le plan a été faite au détriment de quelle priorité ? Avez-vous consulté les populations concernées par cette priorité et Comment ont-elles réagi ?	<p>-A Zangasso oui : Il y a eu 4 actions de ce genre, mais elles n'ont pas été budgétisées au détriment d'autres priorités. Elles ont été faites par délibération du conseil communal et les populations n'ont pas été consultées</p> <p>Pour les autres communes, la question n'était pas applicable.</p>
5. Pourquoi le taux de réalisation des actions prévues dans le plan est si faible ?	<p>La faiblesse du taux de réalisation des actions prévues dans le plan est du à la faiblesse des moyens financiers de la commune et du manque de réalisme dans la planification communale. La commune planifie au dessus de ses capacités de mobilisation financière. Ceci s'explique en partie par le fait qu'au moment de la priorisation des besoins, la commune cherche à satisfaire le plus grand nombre de villages en prenant en compte leurs besoins.</p> <p>- Le faible taux de mobilisation des impôts et taxes explique aussi ce phénomène en plus de la mobilité des populations nomades dans certaine dans certaines communes</p>

Indicateur 1.2 Pourcentage des communes qui se conforment aux procédures légales dans l'exécution de leur budget annuel

Questions	Réponses
<p>1. Séparation des fonctions : Déterminez s'il y a ou non séparation entre les fonctions d'ordonnateur et de comptable. Il s'agit de voir si le maire ordonnateur manipule des fonds publics, prend sur lui-même des fonds recouvrés ou ordonne des dépenses sur des fonds recouvrés avant que ceux-ci ne soit livrés au trésor ; et si le maire ou des conseillers s'immiscent dans la vente de valeurs inactives (tickets de marché, vignettes, etc.) Quelles sont les étapes de recouvrement des recettes et de dépenses en cours ?</p>	<p>Séparation des fonctions : - Pour 6/8 commune cette séparation est effective sans autoconsommation - Pour 2/8 l'autoconsommation intervient ponctuellement en cas de besoin eu égard aux lenteur du trésor - Pour toutes les communes les conseillers ne s'immiscent dans la vente des valeurs actives</p> <p>Recouvrement Implication des chefs de villages ou de quartier qui versent les sommes recouvrées au régisseur de recettes qui à son tour achemine les fonds au Trésor (7/8). Pour 1/8 les chefs de villages ou quartier ne sont pas mentionnés dans le processus de recouvrement</p> <p>Dépenses A l'exception des cas ponctuels d'autoconsommation, le processus est globalement le même : mandat préparé par le régisseur dépenses sur ordre du maire et paiement par le percepteur. La vérification du crédit avant l'ordre du maire est citée dans un cas sur 8.</p> <p>Position du percepteur dans l'exécution du budget Pour les deux communes concernées par cette question, c'est une question de conception. Compte tenu du fait que le percepteur ne réside pas dans la commune, il y a une tendance à le considérer comme n'étant pas un travailleur de la commune.</p>
<p>2. Information de la tutelle : Dans le cas où la commune n'a pas transmis d'information à la tutelle sur l'état d'exécution du budget, quelles en sont les principales raisons ?</p>	<p>- 7/8 communes n'ont pas informé trimestriellement la tutelle sur l'état d'exécution du budget. Une seule l'a fait pour 2005. - Cette disposition de la loi est méconnue de toutes les communes - La tutelle se contente de l'information fournie mensuellement par le percepteur et n'exige pas des communes cette information - Pour la quasi-totalité des communes le compte administratif est le seul outil d'information de la tutelle</p>
<p>3. Information de la population. Y-t-il eu des restitutions aux populations sur l'état d'exécution du budget 2004 ? Si oui, comment ces restitutions ont été faites (groupes ciblés, périodes, données restituées : situations périodiques, compte administratif.</p>	<p>Pour 5 communes la restitution est faite aux populations sur la situation globale des recettes et des dépenses ; dont deux cas où cette restitution est utilisée comme base de sensibilisation de la population pour le paiement des impôts et taxes et un cas, où la fête du 22 Septembre est mise à profit pour communiquer cette information aux populations. Dans 3 cas la population n'est pas informée.</p>

Questions	Réponses
<p>4. Tenue régulière des documents budgétaires et comptables : parmi les documents ci-dessous quels sont ceux qui existent et qui sont régulièrement tenus dans le cadre de l'exécution du budget 2005 ?</p> <p>Ordre de recettes : Bordereau d'ordre de recettes Mandats de paiement Bordereau de mandat Ordre de paiement Journal général Fiches de comptabilité Recettes Fiches de comptabilité Dépenses</p> <p>Avez-vous un compte administratif 2004 voté et approuvé? Si non pourquoi ?</p>	<p>Documents de gestion</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Dans toutes communes les OR, les bordereaux d'OR, les mandats de paiement, les bordereaux de mandat, sont bien tenus. - Les ordres de paiement sont tenus dans 7 cas sur 8 tandis que les fiches de comptabilité de l'ordonnateur (Recettes et dépenses) sont bien tenues dans 6 sur 8 communes. - Quant au journal général 50% des communes ne le tiennent pas. En général les raisons invoquées vont de la méconnaissance du principe (1) au changement intervenu soit au niveau du personnel communal (1) soit au niveau du bureau communal (1) ou simplement du manque d'intérêt de la part du maire (1). - Dans deux des communes le PGP a contribué à l'installation des fiches de comptabilité de l'ordonnateur dans le cadre de la synergie PGP/ PACT : Farako et Cinzana. Les problèmes décelés dans ces communes portent principalement sur l'organisation du travail. <p>Compte Administratif</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Pour 6 communes sur 8 le compte administratif est élaboré dont 3 votés par le conseil communal et 1 déjà approuvé par la tutelle. En général les responsables communaux pensent que ce document doit être soumis à la tutelle au même moment que le budget de l'année suivante. Ce qui explique une tendance à son élaboration tardive. Dans un cas, la commune s'inspire du compte de gestion du percepteur. - Il est en cours d'élaboration pour 2 communes pour lesquelles soit le maire n'en avait pas fait une priorité par méconnaissance, soit que le maire pour éviter d'être confronté à une situation délicate en raison des anciennes dettes non éponnées a préféré attendre.

Indicateur 1.3 : Pourcentage de communes qui ont entrepris des actions de développement dans le cadre d'un partenariat

Questions	Réponses
1. Quel est le nombre total d'entités actives dans la commune ? (associations d'usagers, ONG et projets)	Nombre exact non connu, mais approximativement plus d'une Vingtaine pour les communes urbaines et en dessous pour les communes rurales. Pour les agents communaux la plupart des associations ne sont pas formalisées ce qui bloque la constitution du répertoire. Un répertoire actualisé n'existe donc pas au niveau de la mairie
2. Combien de ces entités ont une relation de partenariat avec la commune ? En quoi consiste le partenariat ? Pourquoi toutes les opportunités de partenariat ne sont pas exploitées ?	<p>La plupart : association des femmes, projets/ONG, organisation de jeunes, organisation paysanne, association des éleveurs, des pêcheurs, des maraîchers, CAFO, GIE locaux dans le domaine de l'assainissement</p> <p>Les partenariats portent sur les prises de décision, les contributions pour la réalisation des activités communautaires (intermédiation avec les partenaires d'appui, appui financiers de la mairie, gestion des équipements) et pour la réalisation des activités communales (réalisation d'infrastructure, actions d'assainissement)</p> <p>Le partenariat entre les Mairies et les AV est faible parce qu'il existe au sein de la plupart de ces AV des crise internes. Tant que ces problèmes de gestion ne sont pas résolus, le partenariat avec la commune serait difficile.</p> <p>Par ailleurs, toutes les opportunités ne sont pas exploitées parce que les autorités municipales n'avaient pas bien cerné toute l'importance du partenariat, c'est donc les projets et ONG qui viennent vers elles mais pas l'inverse</p>
3. Quel est le nombre d'exemples de démarches partenariales initiées localement sur des questions de gestion des équipements, services ou ressources naturelles dans les derniers 12 mois ? Pour chaque exemple, spécifiez de qui venait l'initiative et identifiez le secteur	<p>Au moins 1 à 2 cas par commune ont été initiés autour de la gestion des infrastructures marchandes (foires, marchés à bétail), de l'assainissement, de l'intermédiation avec les partenaires d'appui : cas par exemple de ROCAM, du FODESA</p> <p>Dans la gestion des équipements, l'initiative vient des mairies, la démarche a consisté à une identification des organes de gestion et du mode de gestion à travers l'existence ou pas d'un contrat, une convention ou une délégation, l'engagement des dialogues et des concertations avec ces organes et les partenaires d'appui. Des études de base préalablement menées ont permis de déterminer le potentiel financier pour avoir une base de négociation. Ces cas sont vécus à Niono, Diabaly et Cinzana, Des conventions inter villageoises de GRN existent (Farako, cinzana, Zangasso) initiée par les communautés et appuyé par les mairies, préfecture et des partenaires tels que JEKASI à zangasso (cercle de Koutiala)</p> <p>Dans les mobilisations massives pour les actions publiques de santé, éducation, assainissement, agriculture, l'initiative vient tantôt de la mairie, tantôt des communautés mais le partenariat est fortement soutenu par les 2 parties. Ces actions sont soit dans le PDSEC ou pas</p> <p>Souvent aussi, partenaires financiers et techniques exigent le partenariat interne Mairie-OSC une exigence de leur stratégie d'intervention, cas par exemple de ROCAM, de FODESA</p>

Questions	Réponses
4. Qu'est ce qui explique que les partenariats sont peu formalisés ou que les documents ne sont pas accessibles?	<p>Pour les cas de partenariats internes les acteurs concernés ne le demandent pas à cause de la nature des actions qui sont très souvent des dons ou des œuvres de bienfaisance</p> <p>La méconnaissance de l'importance des protocoles ou conventions explique cela.</p> <p>L'inaccessibilité des documents s'explique par le mauvais archivage. Souvent les maires font de ces papiers leurs propriétés et les perdent par la suite. Ceci arrive très souvent avec les contrats des entrepreneurs pour l'exécution des marchés sur fonds ANICT</p> <p>Les partenaires d'appui signent souvent des accords avec l'état et ne jugent pas nécessaire de le faire avec les communes. Cas par exemple du programme sectoriel de l'éducation, des aménagements à l'office du Niger</p>
5. Qu'est ce qui a changé dans les rapports entre le conseil communal et les organisations communautaires ? Veuillez expliquer pourquoi et comment ce changement est intervenu ?	<p>Les organisations communautaires se rapprochent d'avantage du conseil communal.</p> <p>l'ASACO donne régulièrement ses rapports d'activité à la mairie</p> <p>les jeunes se mobilisent dans la gestion des affaires communales</p> <p>le recouvrement des taxes sur les batteuses des AV se fait avec moins de problème avec l'installation d'un espace de communication</p> <p>la participation aux activités communales (réunions, cadres de réflexion) et le degré d'implication des acteurs clés se sont améliorés</p> <p>A Diabaly le partenariat ASACO-mairie a permis l'obtention d'un médecin affecté au centre</p> <p>Dans la majeure partie des cas ce changement est intervenu à cause du diagnostic communal effectué avec le PGP dans les communes, ce diagnostic participatif a été un facteur déclencheur de la prise de conscience et de la compréhension de l'approche du développement local et communal, et des enjeux de la décentralisation</p>

Indicateur I.4 : Pourcentage de communes qui ont mobilisé des ressources du secteur privé pour la fourniture de biens ou de services publics

Questions	Réponses
1. Existe-t-il des exemples où la commune pourrait entreprendre des actions qui vont dans le sens de combler les besoins – ou collaborer à des projets économiques – du secteur privé (incluant les coopératives) ? Si oui, Expliquez la nature de ces besoins.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Octroi de parcelle à l'association des aviculteurs pour la construction de marché de volaille. - Transmission de la demande d'attribution de parcelle des artisans à la tutelle - Identification des passages d'animaux pour l'association des éleveurs et l'équipement de l'abattoir. - L'implication du secteur privé dans l'élaboration des PDSEC, dans l'organisation des réceptions officielles, la sensibilisation de la population pour l'assainissement, et la mobilisation des ressources financières (impôts et taxes). - A Tominian, la formation en alphabétisation de l'association Badengnouman et en teinture de l'association Sabugnouman.
2. Existe-t-il des cas où le secteur privé et la commune ont des intérêts communs ?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Mobilisation des taxes et impôts - La communication et la sensibilisation envers les populations de la commune - Construction de parc à bétail - Aménagement de la gare routière - A San : le contrat sur l'assainissement du marché entre la mairie et le GIE Jèyton ; le contrat entre la mairie et l'association Sinignèsigi sur l'assainissement de l'abattoir et la boucherie.
3. Qu'est ce qui explique le manque d'investissements de ces opérateurs économiques privés dans les activités de la commune ?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Les opérateurs économiques de la commune n'ont pas assez de pouvoir économique. Ils sont même en retard dans le paiement de leurs impôts et taxes à la commune ; ce qui freine l'initiative de la commune d'aller en eux pour d'autres formes de contribution. -La timidité des investissements des opérateurs économiques privés s'explique par le manque de confiance aux élus communaux et la politisation de la gestion communale (San) - A Tominian il n'y a pas d'opérateurs économiques privés internes. - A Cinzana, il n'y a pas d'opportunités intéressant les opérateurs privés
Dans les grandes orientations du PDESC avez-vous penser à : - formuler une politique de GRN; - Dégager un plan d'action environnemental ; - mettre en place des conventions de GRN ? Si non pourquoi ?	Oui, du reboisement aux conventions GRN et Schémas d'aménagement, des actions sont planifiées et d'autres en cours ou réalisées. Dans certaines communes les planifications-actions sont timides à cause de l'insuffisance de connaissances techniques des acteurs communaux en la matière

Indicateur 1.6 Pourcentage de communes ou le taux de recouvrement des impôts et taxes augmente annuellement

Questions	Réponses
I. Quels sont les 3 principaux facteurs qui ont fait que le taux a augmenté / n'a pas augmenté / a diminué ?	<p>Taux de recouvrement</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Augmentation d'année en année dans 3 cas et en dent de scie dans un cas. Dans tous ces cas un effort de sensibilisation a été mené par les responsables communaux. Dans deux cas on enregistre l'implication des OSC dans ce processus de sensibilisation. Dans un cas des menaces de sanction ont contribué à l'accroissement du taux. L'appui du PGP est cité dans deux cas par rapport au diagnostic des problèmes et à la détermination de stratégies appropriées pour le recouvrement. Pour la commune dont l'évolution est en dent de scie, la mauvaise campagne agricole 2004/2005 est la principale raison évoquée. - Baisse dans 4 cas dont les 3 sont dû à la mauvaise campagne agricole 2004/2005. D'autres facteurs comme le non paiement de ristournes aux chefs de village, le laxisme ou manque de fermeté du conseil communal, l'incivisme de certains contribuables et la faible confiance que la population accorde aux élus ont contribué à cette baisse. <p>1. Le taux a augmenté</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - L'arrivée de la nouvelle équipe a été un atout pour rehausser le niveau de recouvrement des impôts et taxes - la vente précoce des vignettes et menace d'application des sanctions prévues avant le délais prévu (Mars) - la sensibilisation des détenteurs d'engins par rapport à la nécessité de se procurer de la vignette pour échapper au contrôle des communes voisines <p>2. A baissé</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Non paiement des ristournes aux chefs de villages - Incivisme de la population - Laxisme du Conseil Communal - Baisse de l'autorité des chefs de villages <p>3. Le taux a augmenté</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Concours du PGP dans le développement de d'approches et stratégie de recouvrement et la création de cadre d'échange trimestriel PGP/bureau communal pour l'évaluation et la revue de ces approches - Implication des OSC telle que la coordination des jeunes qui a eu à faire des sensibilisations à la radio envers la population - La rentabilisation de nouvelles taxes décelées lors du DPC et qui ont fait l'objet d'activités du PSP de la commune <p>4. Le taux a augmenté</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Implication du sous préfet - Tournée de sensibilisation dans les villages <p>5. Le taux a baissé</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - l'incivisme fiscal de la population dû au manque de confiance des élus - la politisation de la gestion communale - la mauvaise perception/compréhension de la décentralisation par la population <p>6. Le taux a baissé</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Nous sommes en retard dans le recouvrement dû au retard de un an accusé par l'équipe sortante. Une stratégie est mise en place par le conseil villageois et le Conseil communal pour recouvrer les arriérés et celui de 2005. <p>7. Augmentation entre 2003 et 2004 mais baisse entre 2004 et 2005</p> <p>Augmentation : il y a eu des rencontres de sensibilisation avec la</p>

Questions	Réponses
	<p>population avec une forte contribution des groupements féminins. Baisse : Mauvaise campagne agricole 2004/2005 8. Le taux a baissé - Mauvaise campagne agricole - Pas de moyens de déplacement pour le recouvrement - l'incivisme de certains contribuables</p>
<p>2. Est-ce que la commune a des ressources naturelles pour lesquelles il y a des redevances d'exploitation ? Si oui, est-ce que la commune a perçu des services qui gèrent ces ressources des ristournes au cours de 2004 et 2005 ? Si oui, pour quel montant ? Si non, pourquoi ?</p>	<p>- Toutes les communes ont perçu des redevances d'exploitation des ressources naturelles, principalement des ressources forestière en 2004. - En 2005 quatre communes mentionnent ce type de recettes. Une commune indique que ce type de recette est orienté vers une autre destination sans référence à un texte quelconque. Les autres (3) n'ont aucune information sur le sujet. - Les communes se contentent de constater les versements effectués le plus fréquemment par le service de la conservation de la nature et ne cherche pas à identifier si tous ce qui est dû à la commune à ce titre est effectivement versé à son compte. Dans un cas les recherches engagées se sont soldées par un échec, les interlocuteurs au trésor et à la conservation de la nature ne voulant pas livrer cette information du fait qu'elle demande un travail de recherche dans les archives.</p> <p>1.- Mali-évasion qui est une entreprise de chasse sportive n'a pas versé de ristournes à cause du ralentissement de leurs activités - Les recettes forestières en Août 2005 étaient à 117.700 F CFA</p> <p>2.Ressources forestières : 2004 : 618.069 F CFA 2005 : en Juin : 67 410 F CFA</p> <p>3.Ressources forestières : 2004 : 83.159 F CFA 2005 : Aucune. Raison : Selon la perception ces ressources alimentent un fonds au niveau national</p> <p>4.Ressources forestières : 2004 : 65.073 F CFA 2005 : 24 730 F CFA</p> <p>5.Ressources forestières et carrière de sable 2004 : 440 036 de la conservation de la nature 2005 : néant</p> <p>6.Ressources forestières : 2004 : 100.686 F CFA 2005 : 47 048 F CFA</p> <p>7.50% des permis de pêche délivrés. 2004 : 247.783 F CFA 2005 : Aucune information disponible. Non vérifiée par la commune au niveau de la perception.</p> <p>8.Ressources forsières 2004 :468 652 2005 : Aucune information disponible. Non vérifiée par la commune au niveau de la perception. La commune se contente du montant qui est versé à son compte au trésor sans vérification. Les tentatives de vérification ont échoué.</p>

Questions	Réponses
3. Avez-vous une stratégie de GRN. Si oui expliquez. Si non pourquoi ?	<p>- Aucune stratégie cohérente n'apparaît en matière de gestion des ressources naturelles en rapport avec la mobilisation des ressources.</p> <p>- Des prévisions sont mentionnées dans deux cas, mais dans les autres cas la notion semble très floue et confondue avec la politique nationale (par exemple comme stratégie on évoque la gestion par le service de la conservation de la nature et sa délivrance de permis de coupe de bois)</p> <p>- Dans trois cas des raisons sont avancées par rapport à cette absence de stratégie : difficulté d'obtenir les terres pour le reboisement en zone Office du Niger; insuffisance des ressources, non maîtrise des processus pouvant conduire à la définition d'une stratégie.</p> <p>1. La commune a inscrit dans son PDESC 2006-2010 des actions de reboisement et de protection de l'environnement comme l'assainissement et la réalisation d'ouvrages d'assainissement appropriés</p> <p>2. Reboisement mais obtention des terres est difficile</p> <p>3. Non. Pour insuffisance de ressources naturelles d'où la non pertinence d'une stratégie de GRN</p> <p>4. Non. Connaissances insuffisantes en la matière</p> <p>5. Les ressources sont gérées par le service de la conservation de la nature</p> <p>6. La délivrance de permis de coupe de bois par le service de la conservation de la nature</p> <p>7. Voir enquête quantitative</p> <p>8. Pas de stratégie pour le moment, mais en vu avec le PACT</p>
4. Quelle explication avez vous sur le fait que les informations financières de votre commune ne sont pas suffisamment accessibles ?	<p>Pour les deux communes concernées la principale explication réside dans un problème d'organisation et de concertation au sein du personnel communal et entre celui-ci et le maire.</p> <p>1. Il y a un problème d'organisation du travail au sein de la mairie.</p> <p>2.NA</p> <p>3.NA</p> <p>4. NA</p> <p>5.NA</p> <p>6.NA</p> <p>7. Au départ, il y avait pas de régisseur, c'est donc le secrétaire Général qui s'occupait de communiquer les informations financières. Avec l'arrivée du régisseur cette tâche qui lui revient a été occultée. C'est aussi un problème d'organisation au sein de la mairie.</p> <p>8.NA</p>

Indicateur 3.1 Pourcentage des communes où les femmes sont représentées dans les organes de gestion des services sociaux de base

Questions	Réponses
I. Quels sont les facteurs explicatifs de la faible représentation des femmes dans les organes de gestion des services sociaux de base	<p>En plus du poids de la tradition deux autres facteurs sont cités : l'analphabétisme des femmes, et leur manque de confiance en leur capacité à assumer des responsabilités politiques.</p> <p>1. Le constat est national et la commune de Diabaly ne fait pas exception. Le poids des coutumes et l'analphabétisme en sont les explications.</p> <p>2. Les coutumes : les femmes ne doivent pas prendre la parole devant les hommes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Pas de coordination entre toutes les associations féminines <p>3. NA</p> <p>4. Le poids de la tradition</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Formation et information insuffisante des femmes <p>5. le poids de la tradition</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Faible implication des femmes dans les actions locales <p>6. le poids de la culture : la femme ne veut pas trop s'impliquer dans la chose dirigée par les hommes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - l'analphabétisme <p>7. NA</p> <p>8. Les femmes se sous estiment elles mêmes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Le poids de la coutume

Indicateur 3.2 Pourcentage des communes où des activités spécifiques sont menées pour répondre aux besoins des femmes

Questions	Réponses
I. Pourquoi, la réalisation d'actions répondant aux besoins spécifiques des femmes est faible ?	<p>Dans les 4 communes concernées les raisons varient entre l'absence des femmes aux instances de décision et l'insuffisance de partenaires et de ressources financières pour faire face aux besoins spécifiques des femmes.</p> <p>1. NA</p> <p>2. Les hommes décident à la place des femmes tandis qu'ils ignorent les problèmes des femmes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Insuffisance de projet de développement. <p>3. NA</p> <p>4.</p> <p>Manque de financement</p> <p>5.</p> <p>Faiblesse des ressources financières mobilisées par la commune</p> <p>6.</p> <p>Dans ce milieu, la culture impose aux femmes de ne pas réclamer des choses spécifiquement pour elles.</p> <p>Une seule association féminine a bénéficié de l'appui de la commune. Ceci s'explique par deux faits : 1. c'est la seule qui a soumis une doléance à la commune ; et 2. la présidente de l'association est aussi membre du bureau communal (3ème adjointe au maire).</p> <p>7. NA</p> <p>8. NA</p>